The UN and Semi-States: An Examination into Reciprocity and Power

In February 2008, the small semi-state of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, sending a declaration to the United Nations (UN) which was tentatively accepted. This relatively simple declaration came after nearly a decade characterized by constant ethnic tension ranging from mere hostility to outright warfare. Similar to Kosovo have been Abkhazia and Somaliland, other cases in which small subnational enclaves have agitated for statehood. Together, these three case studies reveal a major problem regarding the UN: the failure of its attempts at reciprocity as a direct result of issues of power and national self-interest in relation to semi-states. To properly examine this issue, however, international statehood must be examined. 

The Montevideo Convention, 1933, established what has come to be internationally recognized as the basic theory of statehood. Theoretically, a state exists if it has a fixed territory and population as well as a government that can enter into relations with other states. Semi-states are generally regions agitating for separation which fulfill these requirements and possess a de facto government yet are not internationally recognized. The first case study, Abkhazia, is a struggling area that nonetheless fulfills the statutes previously listed.

Technically part of Georgia, Abkhazia lies at the northern edge of the former Soviet satellite, against the Black Sea. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia fought a war of independence against previously soviet Georgia in the early 1990s, eventually managing to carve out a de facto independence in large part due to Russian support. A former Soviet tourist resort, Abkhazia has since resumed this function with modern Russia.  

In terms of the Montevideo convention, Abkhazia fulfills the basic requirements; though it is certainly dependent on Russian power in the region. Abkhazia has a definite territory, a definite population and a government that has been actively courting international legitimacy for the past fifteen years. Yet, despite a few recognitions by Russia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, Abkhazia remains largely ignored by the international order. This represents a clear example of the failure of reciprocity, an international relations principle built largely around a tit-for-tat, carrot and stick ideology in maintaining international order. By fulfilling the requirements of the Montevideo Convention, Abkhazia has gone through the system, “scratching the back” of the UN. The international system has failed to reciprocate by granting Abkhazia statehood.

This failure in reciprocity can be traced directly to regional power blocs. Abkhazia is undeniably a Russian client state; its mere existence is a result of Russian influence, as without Russian troops Abkhazia would never have managed to break away from Georgia in the 1990s. Russia itself maintains Abkhazia as an exercise in power, flexing its muscles in the region. The existence of Abkhazia helps Russia remind its former satellites in Eastern Europe that it remains a regional power. Abkhazia’s failure to receive legitimacy results from the play of regional power blocs against global power blocs, as the United States blocks Abkhazia’s global overtures to cultivate positive relations with Georgia. Abkhazia’s colony-like status and its inability to achieve international recognition show the influence of regional powers over semi-states.

The next case study, Somaliland, is a surprising success story from a particularly undeveloped part of the globe, the horn of Africa. Somaliland lies off the western coast of the Red Sea, a tiny enclave within the larger, war-torn nation of Somalia. During the reign of the Somalian dictator Siad Barre, Somaliland was ravaged, with the land and the locals decimated. Following his downfall in 1991, Somaliland moved quickly after de facto independence.

Somaliland not only possesses the minimum requirements for statehood, it has thrived in direct contrast to most of the surrounding African states. Possessing a de facto border with Somalia as well as a definite population, Somaliland has been actively courting foreign governments for the past twenty years. Whereas other countries in the area have received international assistance through various governments and NGOs yet still wallow in dictatorship and terrorism, Somaliland has attained a multi-party democracy relatively safe from militants without any aid. Compared with Somalia, ridden by terrorists and still recovering from the Barre dictatorship, Somaliland is a true success story. Despite this, it still has not achieved recognition from any major country or organization, in large part to maintain the current power balance.

The fulfillment of the Montevideo statutes as well as Somaliland’s tremendous successes in creating peace and democracy represent them “scratching the back” of the UN. Following the established system, there is absolutely no question that Somaliland deserves nationhood, considering that their success in applying key principles of the UN- conflict resolution and democracy- to an undeveloped and war torn region of the world. Even if Abkhazia could be struck down from nationhood because of its dependence of Russia, Somaliland’s dramatic successes make it hard to justify refusing their bid. The unwillingness of the UN to recognize Somalilander nationhood is a definite failure in reciprocity.

The reason why Somaliland has not managed to achieve statehood, despite its fulfillment of the Montevideo accords, lies in the local balances of power, same as it did for Abkhazia. Part of the reason Somaliland has stemmed from its support by Christian Ethiopia. Local Arab states are firmly opposed to Ethiopia, seeing independence for the Somalilanders as another Christian nation taking another Arab nation for a colony (a somewhat legitimate concern, considering Ethiopia’s previous attempts to conquer adjoining Eritrea). Furthermore, granting Somaliland independence will lend credence to various African separatist movements; a situation most African states are firmly set against. Thus, despite Somaliland’s stupendous successes, African and Arab states block the area’s legitimate claim to nationhood and keep it from recognition.

Kosovo, the final case study, is perhaps the best known due to its significance during the Balkan War of the mid 1990s, where American and the international community intervened. During and after the Balkan War Ethnic Serbians and Albanians fought for control of the country, with Serbs seeking to keep Kosovo in Serbia and Albanians moving for independence. Serbia was particularly reluctant to release Kosovo, as it was a site of nationalistic significance, being where local Serbs repelled invading Ottomans in 1389. Only numerous interventions from the United States, the UN, and NATO kept Kosovo from sinking into permanent warfare. Following the Kosovo War, 1998 to 1999, Kosovo existed as a semi-state, not yet independent but with a de-facto government separate of Serbia. Finally in 2008, after a decade of bloodshed and various international interventions, Kosovo achieved independence.

In contrast with Abkhazia and Somaliland, the main failure of reciprocity in Kosovo was the UN’s inability to prevent or mediate the conflict. Reciprocity failed to convince Serbia that it was in their better interest to avoid war, or to diffuse the ethnic conflict. Issues of power and nationalism proved stronger, with Serbia determined to keep Kosovo as a national rallying point.

Kosovo’s attainment of statehood does not represent a fulfillment of reciprocity. Though Kosovo had filled the basic requirements of the Montevideo convention, Abkhazia demonstrates that this is not enough to attain statehood. If one were looking at the ideals of both the Convention and the UN, Somaliland would be far more deserving of independence than Kosovo, due to its successful conflict resolution and thriving democracy. Rather, the international acknowledgement of Kosovo’s nationhood was a reaction to an outbreak of inter-state warfare, an exercise in power. Had it not been for the Kosovo War, Kosovo would never have achieved its independence, which was an application of reciprocity to a brutal war. So even when Kosovo achieved statehood, it was not an acknowledgement of semi-state rights.

Taken together, the three case studies show not only a failure in reciprocity and success in power, but evidence contradicting liberalism and supporting realism, the theories behind the principles. Liberalism focuses on avoiding conflict through international systems and diplomacy, while realism emphasizes power and self-interest as more effective ways of preserving order. Abkhazia and Somaliland are semi-states completely ignored by the international system as a direct result of power blocs. Abkhazia’s mere existence is dependent on Russian protection, while Somaliland, despite going above and beyond the Montevideo requirements, is just as ignored as Abkhazia. The Balkan War in Kosovo shows the same failure of reciprocity to power, as liberal conflict resolution failed to prevent war. These cumulative events form an explicit failure of liberalist policy as well as hardcore evidence supporting realist theory.

The true relevance of this case study is in the implications that arise from the interplay between reciprocity and power. First off, current semi-states are often the war-zones of tomorrow, as evidenced by Kosovo and Abkhazia, both of which have previously experienced war and lie tense for future conflicts. By focusing on these semi-states, the international system can either prevent future conflicts or swiftly resolve them. Second, reciprocity in the international system is particularly susceptible to determined use of state power. In both Abkhazia and Somaliland, successful reciprocity was blocked by local powers unwilling to sacrifice regional influence for the sake of the international system. Finally, the existence of a serious flaw in the UN’s handling of semi-states suggests the existence of other flaws. This can be seen in how the international system has handled genocides- Rwanda and Darfur- and rogue states- Iran and North Korea. By comparing and contrasting these issues that face the UN, looking at what works and what doesn’t, better policies and techniques can be fashioned, so that a more successful system can avoid current failings in the future.

Works Cited

"Conflict Profile: Western Balkans." Insight on Conflict. Peace Direct. Web. 15 Sept. 2011. <http://www.insightonconflict.org/>.

Wood, Graeme. "Limbo World: They Start by Acting like Real Countries, Then Hope to Become Them." Foreign Policy 1 Jan. 2010: 48-57. Print.


RESPONSE TO COMMENTS:

Sara: You raise some good points. In response to your first one, I would argue that Chenowith’s analysis of non-violent resistance does not apply to semi-states.  Domestically, semi-states are already largely self-governing; their main problem is international. Chenowith’s analysis of non-violent v. violent resistance is focused specifically at domestic revolution, resistance to some sort of authoritarian government. Now, while you could stage non-violent or violent resistance against international organizations (the best example being the disruption of the WTO Seattle Conference in 1999), this seems to be a different paradigm as rather than being directed against a tyrannical domestic government it is directed at a bureaucratic international organization- beasts of different natures.

Moving aside from Chenoweth and looking specifically at semi-state use of non-violence and violence, I think neither is particularly effective. The reason why Kosovo achieved statehood is not because it employed violence but because the United Nations was responding to a totally different problem- conflict resolution- of which violence is necessarily a factor. Had Kosovo not been part of the Balkan conflict, it would not have achieved independence no matter what.

Sagatom: I apologize if I gave the impression that I was saying that there’s a direct correlation between the UN’s handling of semi-states and its handling of rogue states and genocides. My point there was that all three are areas where the UN has clearly failed in it’s application of the key UN principle: reciprocity. By comparing and contrasting, hopefully some sort of relation can arise that will allow the UN to more effectively employ its resources in the future. I was not attempting to make any wide-reaching conclusion, but to point to areas of further inquiry.

Meg: I agree with most of the points you made there. The points you made reflect realist theory in that the UN focuses on powerful countries at the expense of weaker countries.  From a liberal perspective (as we discussed in class this week) the purpose of the United Nations is to preserve the peace and prevent deviations into war. The liberal ideal is a perfectly peaceful world, not merely one with great powers at peace and all the rest squabbling for the leftovers, the latter of which I would argue is more similar to what we have now. The United Nations can merely ignore the concerns of states like Abkhazia and Somaliland because they have very little international pull. Their lack of power means that the United Nations can shrug them aside, taking a more politically expedient route by giving in to the demands of local states such as Georgia or the African Union.

I apologize for how long it took me to respond to these comments, I posted my paper on blogspot but then it wouldn’t let me comment on my own paper; that is why it has taken me so long to respond. I finally just gave up trying to comment and just tacked these on to the end of my paper. Hopefully these answer your questions, or at least further the conversation!