Monday, September 12, 2011

Identity and Culture in the Middle Eastern-American Conflict

“Why do they hate us?” In her article about American University’s series of lectures on 9/11, Sarah Stankorb reminds us of the fundamental question in the American conflict with Islamic cultures. With the tenth anniversary of 9/11 just past, this continuing ideological conflict remains one of the most relevant issues. Both the domestic conflict – the perception of Muslims as suspicious or enemies – and the conflict abroad have only worsened since the terrorist attack and subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq. A 2004 paper cites a Pew poll of Middle Eastern Muslims where “the majority of respondents (ranging from 67 to 84 percent) believed ‘the spread of American ideas and customs was bad for their country’” (Nisbet 14). Local support for the United States’ military presence in the Middle East remains extremely low.

On the other side of the equation, several recent incidents, such as the controversy over the “Ground Zero mosque” and Terry Jones’ public burning of the Koran, have brought to light the strong current of Islamophobia in American society. Conservatives are growing fearful of Sharia law being implemented in the United States – with no evidence or trend to back this claim – including several states moving to pre-emptively ban the Islamic law (Montopoli). A recent Pew poll found that while 34% of U.S. Muslims had no support whatsoever for extremism, the general public only perceived 12% of U.S. Muslims as having no support for extremism. The same poll shows that 28% of American Muslims experienced people acting suspicious of them, and 21% feel they have been singled out by airport security.

Why do they hate us? Why do we hate them? The problem is of identity.

Samuel P. Huntington’s essay, “The Clash of Civilizations?” argues that along with the rise of self-determination and nation-states, we have seen a rise of ideological clashes. Gone are the wars of princes and the clashes between states, replaced by the wars of ideology (Huntington 23). Economic modernization and social change have weakened the nation-state as a people’s primary identity. Religion, often fundamentalist religion, is moving in to fill this gap (Huntington 26). He claims that, “As people define their identity in ethnic or religious terms, they are likely to see an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion” (29).

A recent Washington Post article highlights the importance of religion as a primary identifier in the Middle East, explaining, “The battle over Islam has become a crucial front in the war between the Taliban and the country’s growing security forces, prompting the Afghan army to create a strategy of its own for proving that its soldiers are true Muslims” (Sieff). The Afghan army wears Western style uniforms and patrols with foreign troops, which the Taliban leaps on to question their religious commitment. Without obvious religious commitment, the army will have little popular support in such a conservative Islamic nation (Sieff). The Taliban can easily exploit the people’s religious self-identification, while an army trying to fight with Americans has a harder time proving itself to the same people.

In the United States, meanwhile, states move to ban Sharia law with no reason. While proponents of the ban argue that they are, in fact, preserving religious freedom (Montopoli), their unfounded fear of Sharia law can only be extrapolated to be an overarching fear of Islam. Likewise, in France the burqa is banned; in Switzerland the building of minarets is banned. This fear is the fear of another civilization’s identity being imposed on us, a fear shared by every civilization the world over. Islamic extremists denounce Western culture, and the United States fights wars against terrorists in the Middle East. In return, the American public lashes out against what is perceived as the domestic element of this extremism. Prejudice is made all the more easy because of long standing conflict in the Middle East and misunderstanding of one another’s culture.

Even in liberal democracies with their emphasis on human rights and personal freedom, religion has never been banished from politics and certainly not from public life. Although far-right Christians may be denounced now in the United States, freedom of religion is not the same as a government without religion. The United States has always had its own conflicts with respecting the social contract while respecting religious beliefs. The United States’ government has always been predominantly Christian. The question of whether the United States’ foundation rests on “Christian values” is debatable, but one cannot deny that religion has always existed within the American government, and Christianity versus Islam is only the latest in a long series of religious conflicts in the United States.

In that case, if we are so driven by our culture, particularly religion, is the liberal ideal of a world community of democracy, let alone the constructivist ideal of political order through shared understanding, even possible? As Huntington points out, “The very notion that there could be a ‘universal civilization’ is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another” (41). This is most relevant in theocracies such as Afghanistan and Iran. The United States has a heterogeneous population, but obviously even the United States has trouble fully accepting all members of that population. Can conservative, homogenous nations driven by religion accept and be accepted by socially liberal, democratic nations?

After all, culture is less changeable than ideology. Instead of “what side are you on?” the question is “what are you” (Huntington 27)? One’s cultural identity can change, but as Hannah Arendt points out, the transition from one culture to another is always difficult. Barriers of language, race, tradition, and religion stand in the way. If even the United States, a nation built on immigrants, has trouble accepting other cultures, can we ever hope for homogenous nations to do the same?

There is some hope for liberalism: The “Arab Spring” suggests distaste for dictatorships in these predominantly Muslim nations. While democracies in the Middle East are burgeoning at best, will we see a crop-up of Middle Eastern Islamic democracies? If so, will Islamophobia in the United States decrease and will Middle Eastern opinion of the United States rise? Will democracies in the Middle East gain freedom of religion or will the conservative element of society inevitably gain the upper hand? The United States government has taken a position of guarded optimism about these revolutions, but will public opinion on either side of the Atlantic change? Essentially, can the liberalist world order of democratic states overcome cultural differences?

Works Cited

Arendt, Hannah. “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man.” Imperialism. Web. 9 Sept. 2011.

Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993 vol. 72 no. 3 22-49. Web. 6 Sept. 2011. <http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/faculty/hauser/PS103/Readings/HuntingtonClashOfCivilizationsForAffSummer93.pdf>

Montopoli, Brian. “Fears of Sharia Law in America Grow Among Conservatives.” CBS News. 13 Oct. 2010. Web. 7 Sept. 2011. <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20019405-503544.html>

Nisbet, Erik, et al. “Public Diplomacy, Television News, and Muslim Opinion.” The International Journal of Press/Politics. Spring 2004 vol. 9 no. 2 11-37. Sage Journals Online. Web. 5 Sept. 2011. <http://hij.sagepub.com/content/9/2/11.full.pdf+html >

Pew Research Center. “Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism.” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 30 Aug. 2011. Pew Research Center. Web. 6 Sept. 2011. <http://people-press.org/2011/08/30/muslim-americans-no-signs-of-growth-in-alienation-or-support-for-extremism/>

Sieff, Kevin. “Afghan army fights to prove its religious credentials.” Washington Post. 6 Sept. 2011. Web. 6 Sept. 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-army-fights-to-prove-its-religious-credentials/2011/08/26/gIQAl6FF6J_story.html>

Stankorb, Sarah. “Religion and Revolution, Post 9/11.” American Today. 2 Sept. 2011. American University. Web. 7 Sept. 2011. < http://www.american.edu/americantoday/campus-news/20110902-9-11-akbar-ahmed-shana-cohen.cfm>

5 comments:

  1. Sara,

    I think you hit the (somewhat gloomy) nail on the head when you talk about the potential incompatibilities between what we might call 'us-talk' and 'them-talk' - our stories about 'who is like us' versus 'who is not like us.' Certainly, the idea that common humanity trumps all differences is sometimes as unpopular in Murfreesboro as it is in Tehran. Richard Rorty sums this problem up quite well:

    http://books.google.com/books?id=9NKaXYtw9YUC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA519#v=onepage&q&f=false

    My question, to you and to anyone else who wants to comment, is: rather than wonder whether liberalism (or, indeed, the pure power calculations of realism) is 'up to the challenge' of mending a sundered world, might it not be useful to focus on what stands in the way of such initiatives? Taking reciprocity at its word, we can see that it places a lot of emphasis on the pacifistic effects of being part of a 'society of states.' But as we saw in class today, some states are 'more equal than others.' Can we really expect liberalism to unite the war-averse citizens of the new Arab democracies when the benefits of economic liberalism (e.g.: a good relationship with the UN and other IGOs, no sanctions) don't always trickle down to street-level? To re-cast my question: what hurdles would (pacifistic) liberalism need to overcome if it was going to beat (bellicose) identity politics?

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  2. To answer the question posed with my answer pertaining to the article, the only way to create universal acceptance of any facet of culture that is not widely accepted, such as Muslims, would be through education. I am from Iowa, and we have a surprisingly large Muslim population in the capital city area. Originally when the Muslims were first coming into the capital city area, where I live, there was aversion to the idea of a Mosque being built because it was only a few years after 9/11. But, now most people are accepting because of educational programs and cultural events in the area which introduced people to the culture.

    To more generally answer the question posed, to overcome identity politics, liberalists would have to be educated in the politics of that particular region of the world. While some liberalists might not see the Arab world as a place of liberal ideals, liberalists can still be accepting and realize that working with other types of political systems and beliefs end up influencing those they are working with, and it also would strengthen the liberal ideals the liberalists live by.

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  3. In response to a few of the questions posed, I would like to say that I do believe it is possible for conservative, homogeneous nations driven by religion to accept and be accepted by socially liberal, democratic nations. I believe that despite the many differences that add to that gap between them, there is a possibility that a mutual understanding and acceptance can be established. While the “Arab Spring” gives democratic nations some form of optimism, this does not excuse the inherent Islamophobia in our nation that has been a driving element in widening that gap. The key step to overcoming cultural differences and closing that gap is to try, as Jonathan pointed out, to educate oneself in the culture of another people and nation. As part of a society of states trying to unite not only the new Arab democracies but the whole world through peaceful methods, we must first take the step to understand other cultures. Rather than follow a realist strategy of using power to promote our ideals in that region of the world and by doing so fuel their idealistic fire against us, we need to show to the world that within the United States and among other democratic nations, there are those more than willing to accept and live peacefully alongside their way of life. By proving the identity politics wrong in their view while also taking a step to understand, we not only better our standing with them through our empathetic effort but with the world entire. Also to add onto Jonathan’s point, by accepting the other political systems and beliefs and working in tandem with them instead of against them, we can have a healthy exchange of ideas and understanding. While I do not have a story relating to Islam, I did in the past go to China on a student ambassador program in order to promote peace and understanding between normal civilians of each country. By doing so, we were able to compare likes and dislikes, hopes and dreams, parts of our culture, and much more, all culminating in a greater understanding of U.S. – Chinese culture. An attempt at understanding is better than butting heads and making enemies with someone you know nothing about because they are different or because their religion happened to be tied in with one of the most terrible events in U.S. history. Continuing to blame and accuse innocent people for extremist actions taken by others who follow their religion accomplishes nothing.

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  4. Generally I think that it is possible to overcome cultural differences via liberalism and education. What it is exactly that people have to overcome in terms of cultural disparities is the fact that it is a natural human reaction to fear things and people that are unfamiliar. In this sense, unfamiliar group takes on the role of a potential aggressor. Due to the fact that little is known about the subject (or the fact that the population is unwilling to make the effort to learn), the safest and most instinctive reaction would be one of suspicion and doubt. (which is consistent with many Americans' lack of cultural knowledge of Middle Eastern and Islamic culture). However, generally through increased interaction and cultural awareness, different groups can look past their group identities and naturally identify with the basic human elements that exist within themselves and which they come to recognize in other sects they may encounter. For example, when the Roman Empire chose to expand its influence in Spain there was little cultural conflict. This occurred because the Romans introduced to the indigenous Spaniards systems of transportation, law, and policy that they could both identify with on a positive and practical human level, causing the Spaniards to look past (and even adopt) some elements of the Roman culture. The exception to this concept comes not as an absolute, but more as a protraction in terms of the time it takes for cultural acceptance. In the case of perceived American Islamophobia, liberal cohesion between the nation and those who belong to the religion is not likely in the near future (at least not on a large scale). This is due to the reversion of the willingness of Americans to overcome their instinct to fear the unfamiliar. This reversion largely came as a result of the radical islamist group Al-Queda's terrorist strike against the U.S. on 9/11. Many Americans implicate the entire Islamic faith with the actions of this single terrorist group because their instinct for self-preservation shifts the scale against cultural acceptance and towards fear of the unfamiliar, which at this point seems somewhat justified because of the actions of a number of members of the said religious group, which instead of treating as an anomaly, Americans take as a representation of the entire faith. This is among the reasons why of any religion (including atheism) Americans have the lowest public approval rating of Islam. Obviously there are many Americans who are willing to accept Islam as a culture, however, the natural progression toward large scale acceptance of Islam has been wounded by the events of 9/11 that have in turn pushed Americans to fall back on suspicion and doubt.

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  5. I agree with everyone that the only real way to overcome cultural differences is through peaceful education and integration of culture and that we should work toward that. However, (just to play the devil's advocate) I would question whether that is really possible on a global scale. Large elements of American culture and Islamic culture seem unwilling to accept each other. Certain countries (for example, North Korea) actively work against being influenced by other cultures by cutting off communication with them.

    I suppose what I'm asking is: Is meshing cultures across the entire globe possible given the active resistance to it in some areas? Is it even desirable, or should we try to preserve distinction between culture and avoid homogenization through excessive heterogeneity? Even if we try to promote cultural understanding, will the global hegemon just inadvertently end up imposing its culture upon others instead of the other way around?

    I don't know if these questions are really answerable at this point in history, or if considering them is just a thought experiment without much evidence to back it up...

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