Professor Chenoweth's Talk on Civil Resistance

Like so many others around the globe, this past spring I was captivated by the movement that occurred in Egypt. The way that such a huge amount of people were able to coordinate and work together and bring about major changes using barely any violence or warfare was fascinating to me. I haven’t really been aware of modern nonviolent civil resistance movements – the only one I could think of off the top of my head is the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. So when I learned of Professor Chenoweth’s talk on civil resistance, I was interested to hear what she would have to say about the topic.

Dr. Erica Chenoweth is Assistant Professor of Government at Wesleyan University, teaching courses on international relations, terrorism, civil war, and contemporary warfare. She has written three books and numerous articles for Foreign Policy and other magazines, as well as her own blog, Rational Insurgent. The title of this blog is a terminology that she explained in two parts: an insurgent is, by definition, a rebel, and a rational person is one who thinks logically. So a “rational insurgent” would be a person who tries to bring about change in a thoughtful, clear-headed way. This term can describe those who participate in civil nonviolent resistance instead of violent fighting to rebel. Professor Chenoweth explained that she did not have an agenda going into her research. She had been skeptical about the impact that nonviolent resistance could have, because she was more used to studying violent warfare in her academic career. She was not a pacifist nor did she have strong moral beliefs, as she put it. But in 2006 she participated in a workshop, and in the reading she did in preparation for it she was inspired by some of what she read about nonviolent resistance. Soon after, she began research to try to quantify just how effective nonviolence resistance could be and was surprised by the results she got.

The three main arguments Dr. Chenoweth based her talk on were that one, nonviolent resistance is a superior strategy; two, nonviolent resistance often works and it succeeds in places one might not expect, such as brutal dictatorships; and three, that nonviolent resistance and “the norms that it generates” (such as a sense of unity, morality) produces more positive effects for people. These arguments are founded on data that Chenoweth collected from 323 nonviolent and violent campaigns from 1900-2006, all of which had over one thousand participants. Typical variables observed in these campaigns included peak membership, security force defections, government repression, material support received from foreign sources, nation’s population, and regime type. The results: fifty percent of nonviolent campaigns were successful in achieving their goals while only twenty percent of violent campaigns achieved this level of success. About thirty percent of nonviolent campaigns ended in failure, but so did seventy-five percent of violent campaigns. The remaining percentages were classified as partial successes, for which there was a higher rate among nonviolent movements.

The rising success rate of nonviolent movements can be attributed to several factors. Participation in nonviolent campaigns is much more manageable for citizens than an armed campaign. There are no physical strength requirements in most nonviolent campaigns, as there would be in a violent one in order to handle weapons and other equipment. Nonviolent movements allow people to see more of what is going on – there is a free flow of information because the campaign is public and therefore seems a less risky endeavor because everything going on is out in the open, whether on the streets or in the media, whereas in an armed campaign operations need to be kept secretive so as not to be stopped or attacked by government forces. There are fewer commitment problems with nonviolent movements, as it is not necessary to quit one’s job or devote long periods of time to the cause, as opposed to armed conflict where once a person has joined, it is difficult and even dangerous to leave. In addition, a person who joins an armed campaign is faced with complicated moral decisions when they use weapons, while there is usually no need for moral distress in a nonviolent campaign.

A key factor in nonviolent movements is the amount of people. The more people involved in a nonviolent campaign, the higher probability of success it has. Often the sheer number of people in a mass protest makes it nearly impossible for a regime to round people up. The more people there are and the more diverse the crowd is, the harder it is to compel loyalty to the government from their own forces because if soldiers can relate to the crowd, it will evoke sympathy. They might have family members or friends in there, and will refuse to shoot unarmed protesters. Dr. Chenoweth pointed out that this type of security defect occurred in the recent uprising in Syria. Soldiers were ordered to shoot in places where there were unarmed men, women and children, but refused and consequently joined the rebels’ side. As well as military challenges, a nonviolent campaign will also present other issues for a government. If enough of the population participates, the movement will impede economic activity, which will frustrate international and local businesses and organizations, therefore creating financial problems for the government. Also, the media attention that a large organized nonviolent campaign will draw can help the movement communicate to the outside world and may be unwanted negative publicity for a regime, which will force it to take measures to protect their international reputation.

All in all, Chenoweth’s talk was quite thought-provoking because it presented examples and quantitative data that challenge many common perceptions of nonviolent and violent campaigns and evidence that nonviolence is a superior protest strategy. However, there are certain areas in which both violent and nonviolent movements do not seem to have any long-term effect, such as Nicaragua. This is problematic because if people are suffering under such extreme oppression that not even large-scale protests can change government policies, their human rights are being violated and they need assistance. But whose responsibility is it to do this, and how? This issue was not addressed in Professor Chenoweth’s talk, so it seems that there is not a specific solution for this kind of problem except perhaps to simply wait for the government to show a sign of weakness (such as a dictator falling ill) and take advantage of the timing. While it is true that not all nonviolent campaigns work and that some violent campaigns do, her statistics illustrate that nonviolence is a more effective method of reaching a common goal.

-Alana Davicino