Reciprocity, Identity, Power: The US and France in Libya

Around 17 February 2011, protests opposing the regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi broke out in Libya, marking the beginning of its civil war, and adding it to the list of countries to take part in what has already come to be known as the Arab Spring. As in Egypt and Tunisia before, protestors aimed to overthrow the government; unlike in these other two countries, however, the revolution in Libya was not quick, and instead devolved into civil war. By 20 February, protests had spread to the capital, Tripoli; the death toll quickly reached the thousands. On 17 March, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, and allowed for any measures necessary to be taken in protection of civilians. The US, France, and the United Kingdom intervened two days later with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces; the intervention was soon joined by a coalition of twenty-seven European and Middle Eastern states.

Upon taking a closer look at the US, French, and British intervention, an atypical course of events becomes apparent. For once it was not the US that jumped immediately into the fight; in fact it was France, along with Britain, that led the effort to aid Libyan rebels in ousting Gaddafi. This represents a markedly different order of business from recent policy history, both for the US and France. After all, people from various countries around the world tend to hold an image of America as the hegemon, nosing its way into other countries’ business without invitation – and the recent past of US foreign policy does little to dispute this notion (Damerow).

This image stems partly from the frequent use of preventative war during the presidency of George W. Bush, as part of US foreign policy under the “Bush Doctrine.” The policy holds that the US should depose foreign regimes that represent a perceived threat to national security, and that the US should attempt to spread democracy in the Middle East as an anti-terrorism strategy. In effect, this was the policy followed in beginning the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq – wars which have lasted for years, and have cost America billions of dollars and thousands of soldiers. The Doctrine, for better or worse, has defined American foreign policy for some years. However, when civil war broke out in Libya, the US did not immediately step in. Rather, the Obama Administration decided that it would not intervene without first establishing a multilateral coalition.

Such a coalition was made possible through the aforementioned UN Resolution 1973, which provided the intervention with international legitimacy. For once, other countries – this time France and Britain – requested US aid; it was only after this had occurred that the Obama Administration agreed to take on a supporting role in the operation, which was intended to be more humanitarian than militant. The role was supporting in that, after the initial air strikes, the US took a back seat and instead allowed its NATO partners to continue the intervention. Some have speculated that this new style of intervention could mark a new era in US foreign policy, an era in which the US acts as part of a coalition, and waits for requests for support from the local populace of the country in conflict, before stepping in (Zakaria).

At the other end of the spectrum in terms of reaction to the Libyan conflict was France which, along with Britain, led in the call for sanctions against, and intervention in, Libya. But why did France jump to the forefront in this conflict? Following the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, the French government took criticism for failing to react quickly (Fraser). Furthermore, former French foreign minister Michelle Alliot-Marie was found to have been vacationing in Tunisia, and to have had ties to the family of the deposed Tunisian president. Unsurprisingly, this cast her in a questionable light and in no way helped the image of the French government, nor that of President Sarkozy. Mr. Sarkozy has taken criticism for his government’s foreign policy for many years; as a result, jumping to the lead in the Libyan intervention has been viewed by some as an attempt to restore credibility and improve image on the part of the French government (Fraser).

The principles of power, identity, and – most importantly – reciprocity, can be used to explore the reactions of the US and France to the conflict in Libya. In waiting for the formation of a multilateral coalition prior to engaging in Libya, the Obama Administration did not play the usual card of dominating a conflict by power alone. Rather, a reciprocal relationship was sought out and, once established, the US was able to collaborate with its fellow NATO members in order to share the burden in assisting Libya. This way, the US was not getting itself into yet another conflict where American intervention was unwanted by both local peoples and the American public.

The US’s role was clearly established as that of a partner in a joint effort, rather than as the leader of the operation, which helped to stem criticism, both domestically and internationally (Zakaria). The Obama Administration was, as a result, able to make the argument that American involvement in the intervention was justified (Cortright). The US was not stepping in where it had no business; rather, once asked by its NATO allies, it was simply doing its duty to assist a country that also wanted its help. After all, it would have been hypocritical to publically condemn Gaddafi for the way in which he was murdering his citizens and then, when asked to assist in preventing further civilian casualties, do nothing at all. Making such an argument in order to gain domestic support for the intervention appealed to the American sense of identity; part of American pride has to do with viewing the United States as a steward of freedom and human rights. When both are being violated, and American help has been sought out, how can the country say no without going against all that it, as a nation, stands for? Furthermore, in portraying the intervention as a humanitarian, rather than military, effort, the Obama Administration and the other NATO nations were able to garner stronger international support for the cause through appealing to a greater sense of identity.

France, likewise, used reciprocity in its Libya strategy, albeit to a slightly different end. Whereas the US waited until a UN Resolution had been passed and its assistance requested before acting, France jumped much more quickly into action. Soon after the Libyan civil war got underway, France began to call for sanctions. The sanctions were an attempt to persuade Gaddafi to step down and end the fighting; they would be lifted once the conflict had ceased.

The way in which France immediately aligned itself with Britain and the US in its intervention effort demonstrates its use of reciprocity in what could potentially be a new era of multilateralism for the county. During the years prior to the crisis in Libya, France’s influence in Europe had seen a steady decline; this alliance allowed for France reaffirm its power and play a key role in the intervention without carrying all of the weight of the effort solo (Borger). However, by virtue of being at the forefront of the call for intervention, France sought to appeal to French identity in order to help restore the government’s image domestically. As French national identity has much to do with how it is perceived internationally, playing a leading role in the coalition shows France in a favorable light, as a world power, and thus gains the government support from the people (Borger). Through calling for action and leading the intervention, France showed that it does indeed have weight in the international playing field, and is able to use its power as a developed European nation in order to take part in the organization and execution of a multilateral effort.

Because the Libya crisis showcased a departure from what’s come to be seen as the norm for both the United States and France with regards to international conflict, one key question remains: Will the way in which both countries responded mark a shift in foreign policy? It is possible that policy in the US will become less about exercising dominance, and more about using reciprocity in order to establish multilateral coalitions with support garnered through a shared sense of identity, in order to resolve international conflicts. And perhaps policy in France will shift to reflect the use of reciprocity in order to establish greater power in the world, and a stronger sense of national identity.

It is as yet too early to know for sure whether the Obama Administration’s response to Libya will become a new “Obama Doctrine” of foreign policy. At the present, the strategy employed appears to have worked; however, some critics of the Administration’s response have argued that, had the US intervened more fully and more quickly, the conflict in Libya may have ended sooner and with less bloodshed (Ezzatyar). It is impossible to know if this really would have been the case, or if the US would have found itself entrenched in yet another unpopular war on foreign soil.

An eye will also have to be kept on France in order to determine whether or not their foreign policy has seen a shift. It will be interesting to see how the apparent success of the Libya intervention affects the popularity of President Sarkozy and the public opinion of the government, as well as perceived national identity. It is possible that the way in which Mr. Sarkozy jumped into action will gain him some support and help to restore the image of the French government. However, it is also possible that, even if the Libya effort gained some favor among the French people, it will not be enough to win Mr. Sarkozy re-election. Monitoring approval polls, and the results of the coming French elections, will likely give some indication as to the French public’s response to its government’s success in Libya.

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