Successes and Failures of Liberal Theory in Cuba and Vietnam

On December 1956, Fidel Castro touched ground on the southeastern coast of Cuba, accompanied by a ragtag band of rebels determined to overthrow the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Over the course of the next three years, through guerilla warfare and public antipathy towards Batista, Castro was able to drive the dictator from the island and establish his own Cuba. This change in regimes would lead directly to two of the most relevant foreign policy occurrences during the sixties: the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. These events, along with American involvement in Vietnam, reveal important truths about liberalism. Liberalism sometimes works, succeeding in Cuba while failing in Vietnam. The success of liberal theory hinges on negative reciprocity, active in Cuba but missing in Vietnam.  

Cuba provides two case studies for liberalism: the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The former demonstrates a success in liberalism in that America decided not to invade Cuba itself and expand the conflict, whereas the latter represents a success as America and Russia came to the tipping point of nuclear war and successfully averted it. In both situations negative reciprocity, the punishment aspect, was instrumental to conflict aversion.

Immediately after Castro came to power he began to nationalize the massive land holdings of American companies in Cuba (McWilliams and Piotrowski 89). The initial conflict with America was over compensation for nationalization; however deeper conflict lied in Castro challenging the traditional American political domination of Cuba which dated back to the Spanish American War. In retaliation, America placed a full embargo against Cuba, devastating the Cuban economy (dependent on American consumption of sugar exports) and driving it to an alliance with the USSR (McWilliams and Piotrowski 90). In 1961, Eisenhower handed over the reins of power to Kennedy, who quickly approved a scheme to overthrow Castro. In April 1961, 1500 Cuban exiles, trained by the CIA, landed at the Bay of Pigs attempting to spark a popular uprising. They were quickly defeated, with the entire force either killed or captured.

Some might argue that the Bay of Pigs is a failure in liberalism, for merely happening in the first place. However, liberalism was truly successful in preventing an escalation of the conflict. Reciprocity kept Kennedy from green-lighting an American invasion of Cuba, as many called for him to do (specifically the Cuban exiles).  Such an act would have violated “international law and promised international and domestic repercussions” (McWilliams and Piotrowski 91). Those repercussions represent the stick element of reciprocity, as the United States would have faced international punishments for such a blatant violation of international agreements. As well, a further invasion would have done irreparable damage to international perception of the United States. Negative reciprocity kept America from escalating the conflict with the Bay of Pigs, as it did with the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  Following the Bay of Pigs, Cuba continued to strengthen its ties with Russia, further aligning itself with communism and the USSR. This alliance strengthened to the point where Khrushchev put nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962: an attempt to achieve nuclear parity with America and increase Russian international influence (McWilliams and Piotrowski 92-93).  When the CIA became aware of missile silos being constructed, Washington decided to blockade the island with the US navy to gain more time. In return for a withdrawal of nukes from Cuba, Russia demanded American nuke withdrawal from Turkey as well as American recognition of Cuban sovereignty and promise not to invade. For several days, neither side backed down (McWilliams and Piotrowski 94). Eventually however, Kennedy acceded to both demands, only holding that the withdrawal of nukes from Turkey be covert. Russia agreed, and shortly removed the silos and missiles from Cuba.

Liberalism allowed the two superpowers to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis, succeeding through aversion of nuclear war. The threat of mutual nuclear annihilation proved a powerful stick, functioning as negative reciprocity. This threat led to extreme caution on either side, and brought each of them to the negotiating table. In a good example of reciprocity, each side compromised: America gave Russia its recognition of Cuba and safety from Turkish nukes, while Russia allowed America to withdraw the Turkish nukes covertly. In return, each side gained greater nuclear safety, and accomplished their goals. Kennedy had considered either launching missile strikes against the silos being built in Cuba, or launching an invasion of Cuba (McWilliams and Piotrowski 94). Both of these options were rejected because they carried the distinct possibility of nuclear war. Negative reciprocity- the threat of nuclear annihilation- forced Kennedy to embargo Cuba rather than invade and brought both parties to the negotiating table, leading to a successful resolution of the conflict.

Whereas both incidents with Cuba show liberal theory succeed, the next case study is an undoubted failure. American involvement in Vietnam flouted international agreements and eventually pulled the country into its most disastrous foreign conflict. Through both disrespect for the international system and the outcome of war, Vietnam is a failure for liberal theory.  

In 1954, the French withdrew from their former colony of Indochina, of which Vietnam was a part. The Geneva Accords facilitated this withdrawal, dividing Vietnam into a communist North and monarchial South (McWilliams and Piotrowski 188). The accords set two directives: that in 1956 Vietnam would unify under a supervised election and that neither part of Vietnam would make military alliances. Shortly after the accords however, the Southern monarch was deposed by Ngo Dienh Diem, who created a dictatorship. South Vietnam became an American client state as Washington flouted the Geneva Accords, aligning with Diem while pouring advisers and weapons into the country. As Diem’s regime became increasingly unpopular, resistance groups formed and grew in strength, challenging the South Vietnamese government.

Eventually, events came to the point where South Vietnam could not survive without direct American intervention. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, in 1964, provided Johnson with a pretext to send over American troops with Washington claiming an American destroyer, the USS Maddox, had been attacked in international waters by the North Vietnamese (McWilliams and Piotrowski 193). In reality it had been in North Vietnamese waters running support for Southern commandos. Following Johnson’s story, Congress authorized Johnson to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and prevent further aggression,” beginning the Vietnam war. (McWilliams and Piotrowski 194). These cumulative events clearly demarcate a failure in liberalism, through America’s disregard for the Geneva Accords, an international agreement, and the entrance of America into the Vietnam War.

American involvement shows a failure of liberal institutionalism, a failure of collective security, and results from a lack of negative reciprocity.  Liberal institutionalism posits that states will avoid war because while conflict may advance short term interests, it ultimately damages long term, collective interests. Institutionalism failed in Vietnam due to the clash of ideologies between capitalism and communism, with America breaking the Geneva accords. Johnson became so committed to Vietnam because of concerns over his administration receiving blame for another country going communist (McWilliams and Piotrowski 192). America’s actual entrance into the war further demonstrates the trumping of ideology over institutionalism as well as a failure in collective security. Johnson’s commitment to supporting South Vietnam, a result of ideology, grew to the point where he directly entered America into the conflict. Ideology so ruled American foreign policy that it led to broken international treaties and unprovoked war.  

Collective security is a liberal concept that when war occurs, it is usually the result of a single aggressor. A formation of states ought to be formed, so that the rest of the world can unite against the aggressor to preserve the peace. American troops in Vietnam represent a superpower intervening in what ought to have been a domestic crisis.  For collective security to have held true, all other world states ought to have attacked America; the fact that this did not happen acts against collective security. Worse for the idea of collective security, however, is that even if all other states had banded against the aggressor, this would not have served to punish the US. Rather, it would have merely spread the conflict, due to America’s superpower stature. Most likely, such a widening would have turned nuclear, with dire results.

Finally, the lack of negative reciprocity played a role as well, contributing to the failure of the Geneva accords and the US entrance. Final documents were left unsigned, with no real punishments created for parties who infringed the accords. Thus, no negative incentives existed to keep the US from meddling in Vietnam. The same applies to actual American deployment to Vietnam; there were no international punishments to keep America from invading.

The ultimate effect of these case studies is to demonstrate the necessity of negative reciprocity to functioning liberal theory. In those cases where liberal theory succeeded, Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was a direct result of negative reciprocity. In those cases where liberal theory failed, American involvement with Vietnam pre- and post-Tonkin, it was in part due to a lack of meaningful negative reciprocity. In Vietnam, America did not find more ambiguous, long term advantages resulting from international cooperation to be meaningful, with these benefits overtaken by ideological concerns. The threat of further international condemnation during the Bay of Pigs and nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis proved far more persuasive in pushing America towards peaceful resolution. As an addendum, the relevance of ideology in perpetuating Vietnam suggests certain significance to constructivist theory.

Through examining previous case studies, more effective policies can be shaped for the future. Cuba and Vietnam demonstrate the importance of negative reciprocity to successful liberal policy. Thus, a significant backing by the international community to punish any country in violation of international agreements could make such agreements far more successful, such as nuclear regulations of trade statutes. By focusing on negative reciprocity, those situations where liberalism fails could be better resolved.  

Works Cited

"Bay of Pigs Invasion (Cuban-United States History) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/56682/Bay-of-Pigs-invasion>.

"Cuba :: The Castro Regime -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/145542/Cuba/54425/The-Castro-regime?anchor=ref515704>.  

"Geneva Accords (history of Indochina) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 09 Oct. 2011. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/229032/Geneva-Accords.

McWilliams, Wayne C., and Harry Piotrowski. The World Since 1945: a History of International Relations. Boulder, Colo: Rienner, 1990. Print.

 

RESPONSES TO COMMENTS

SARA: If anything, I think the fact that negative reciprocity played such a role during the cold war makes its influence all the more impressive. The Cold War was a conflicted focused very much on power and control, with realist thinking often dominant. I agree that the context of the Cold War means that the US and USSR were more likely to ignore the “rules” of the international system and play on their own terms, as each side felt that the stakes were huge (again, a result of ideology). Despite this focus on power and the battle for international dominance, negative reciprocity still played a largely influential role in the Cuban Conflicts. Personally, I think this shows a certain resiliency to liberal theory, or at least using reciprocity as an international approach. Negative reciprocity can certainly be one of the most influential tools in the IR toolkit, however it can be the hardest to wield as countries can be unwilling to commit resources to a punishment or alienate the target country in such a way.

JAS: In response to your first question, I think the two are intertwined; the answer is both. Communism was a challenge both to American hegemony and to the American socio-economic order. Internationally, it challenged our dominance and power following World War I. Domestically, it challenged the roots of American culture and our perceived way of life, based around capitalism and private property. Policy makers in wanted were terrified of either possibility; they wanted to maintain and expand American political influence across the globe. This combined with the diametric opposition of Communism to Capitalism to greatly exacerbate conflict and competition between the two superpowers.

I think your second question is really interesting. Certainly, there are numerous examples of America overthrowing third world democracies that tilted towards socialism and replacing them with military dictatorships. The examples abound: El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, etc. All states that either had existing democracies or were moving towards democracies, but domestic socialist elements within the states produced an overreaction in the US, which sent in the CIA to organize a military dictatorship. The Iranian Revolution in ’79 was a reaction against American meddling; if we had not intervened in the fifties Iran might have gone down a path similar to Turkey’s. But I digress. Personally, I think that had the USSR been democratic there would have been less conflict, going along the lines of the idea of Democratic peace. However, the US slide towards post-war Imperialism along with the massive ideological conflict would have produced some sort of conflict between the two countries, regardless of democratic influences.

HAILI: Personally, I am disgusted by American involvement in Cuba. It was a blatant attempt at imperialism, completely overriding the sovereignty of the Cuban people. After the Spanish American war the US basically held the Cuban provisional government hostage until they agreed to essentially become American puppets. As I understand it, conflict between Cuba and the US began when Castro defied the US and sought to end the economy hegemony of American corporations, which led to the blockade, which led to Cuba going soviet, which led to the Bay of Pigs. You’re right though, the Cuban-Soviet alliance did lead to a further break in Cuban American relations that pushed Kennedy to the Bay of Pigs. In terms of Identity, Castro was able to harness Cuban nationalist sentiment and oppose American meddling. Indeed, much of the reason why there is so much anti-American sentiment in the world is because America has meddled so much in the world, during the Cold War at least.