Caroline Brazill
Professor Craig
World Politics 001H
18 September 2011
In hindsight, we ask how the Rwandan genocide could have happened—how, in a matter of 100 days, could 800,000 civilians have been mercilessly slaughtered? Simply put, conflict in Rwanda spiraled out of control because the world refused to intervene. And again, that “why” comes up. Why did the world simply turn the other cheek as the bodies continued piling up? Why was a willingness to help seemingly tossed to the side?
Tension was nothing new in Rwanda. Hostility between the controlled the African country, they preferred the minority Tutsis to the majority Hutus. Resentment among Hutus resulted in several riots and the death of 20,000 Tutsis in 1959. When Rwanda became an independent nation in 1962, Hutus took control of the government, still carrying animosity toward the Tutsis (“Rwanda: How Genocide Happened” 1).
Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana quickly began losing popularity, and Tutsi rebels formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with the goal of overthrowing him and securing their land. After several attacks and on and off negotiations, a peace agreement, The Arusha Accord, was signed in 1993 (“Rwanda: How Genocide Happened” 1); Extremists in the military were staunchly opposed to this end of one party rule in politics (Ferroggiaro 1).
When the Arusha Accord was signed, the United Nations developed a mandate and organized a mission, led by General Romeo Dallaire, to determine if a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was possible. Dallaire reported back affirmateively and began lobbying for the support of member nations as the mandate was debated. He had very little luck; most nations were unwilling to commit troops for peacekeeping. The United Nations Security Council approved General Dallaire’s mission but reduced many capabilities, which created enormous problems down the road. According to Dallaire, the emphasis of those reviewing the report was on low cost and limited time (Barker 1).
It soon became clear to General Dallaire, however, that the Rwandan mission was not one of short term commitment. His team began receiving accounts of rising extremist and militia groups. Dalliare did not have any tangible evidence to present to the United Nations until early January 1994 when an informant told him about planned large scale attacks on Tutsis and Hutu moderates. General Dallaire was also able to confirm that there were arms caches for these attacks. With this information, he sent a fax to the United Nations, asking to expand the Rwanda mandate to include intelligence capability, which would extend his mission politically and militarily. His request was quickly denied (Barker 2).
The breaking point came when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6th, 1994. Hutu extremists are thought to be responsible for the attack. Within hours, these extremists began killing innocent civilians and political moderates.
The situation in Rwanda quickly deteriorated; civilians were killed by the masses. The international community first expressed legitimate concern, though, only after the death of ten Belgian soldiers. Their response? Run. Belgium withdrew its remaining forces soon after the incident, and the UN, still refusing to expand the mission, significantly downsized Dallaire’s forces to a point where they could do little more than watch thousands of civilians die daily. Dallaire ultimately left Rwanda feeling cheated by the international system (Barker 3).
Cheating, failure, disinterest—these words have come to describe the international response to the genocide. As the number of casualties continued to climb, nations of the world remained unwilling to give any of their own resources to stop the mass murders. Three big names come to mind when we consider the worldwide reaction to these killings: the United Nations and the United States, known for their lack of action, and France, known as one of the only countries that did answer Rwandans’ calls for help.
When searching for an explanation to attach to these responses (or lack thereof) to Rwanda as a collective action problem, we can’t blame a shortage of reciprocity; nations of the world never expected much of Rwanda, especially as its economy suffered throughout the middle of the twentieth century. Nor can we blame a lack of dominance; no one needed Rwanda to secure influence.
What we can blame, though, is a lack of identity—that is, a lack of concern for group interests above one’s own. The United Nations chose to identify with its specific, black and white procedures over the unfolding humanitarian crisis. The United States identified with its own concerns first and foremost, without any consideration for the greater good. France, though, identified with Rwandans out of ethical compulsion.
The United Nation’s ability to identify with the situation in Rwanda was hampered by its emphasis on technical aspects of the mission. From the time the Arusha Accord was signed and the Security Council reviewed Dallaire’s first report, the UN’s approach was firmly set as one of minimal effort; Dallaire was instructed to stay at arm’s length (Barker 2). On top of the slashed resource supply, Charter VI of the mandate for the Rwanda mission forbade Dallaire from using any intelligence capability, even after he warned of a large-scale threat. The United Nations was also vehemently against sending additional peacekeeping forces to Rwanda, due to frustration over cost as well as paranoia over the recent failed mission in Somalia (Power 5). Ultimately, the United Nations became convinced that what they had already given to Rwanda in terms of effort and resources was enough to maintain stability. When this assumption was proven incorrect, too much frugality and not enough enthusiasm translated to an unwillingness to identify with the Rwandan people to put forth the extra power to solve the problem.
The United States’ lack of action was due to an inability to attach any sense of urgency to the Rwandan genocide. As the fragile situation began unfolding, the U.S. government viewed it in very abstract terms; there was hardly any talk of human casualties, even as reports started flooding in about the extent of the problem. The U.S. has since attributed its idleness to a lack of information, but conflicting reports suggest that U.S. officials knew of the Hutu intents just two days after the Rwandan president’s plane went down (Des Forges 141). Even after the extent of the killings was finally realized, the U.S. remained idle—this time taking a defeatist attitude by over exaggerating the early extent of the killings and refusing to send troops based on the idea that not much could be done for those still alive (Des Forges 142). With this rationale, the only intervening the United States chose to initiate was in self-interest, removing its own civilians from Rwanda without hesitation. The speed of the Rwandan genocide failed to convince the U.S. to widen the scope of its concern; the extent of the massacres, when realized, was selfishly used to justify inaction rather than action.
France, by contrast, did not choose inaction. Eleven weeks after the killings began, France sent troops into Rwanda. Officials specifically stated that they were acting to protect Rwandans because no other country had taken initiative (Simons 1). The troops were under specific orders not to occupy any territory, and to assess the need of all refugees, regardless of ethnic origin. These efforts received little international support, once again due to the lack of passion for international peacekeeping and frustration with the U.N. France was one of the only nations to identify with and therefore respond to Rwandans in the major humanitarian crisis. The French mission was motivated by a feeling of responsibility to avert crisis that outweighed the concerns about material costs.
So, what lesson can the international community take away from Rwanda? By examining the choices of three major players in response to the disaster, it is apparent that an ability to identify will translate into a willingness to act. A lack of identity was at the core of the lack of response to Rwandan genocide by the United Nations and the United States, while France’s feeling of moral obligation to put the common good above its own interests drove its late involvement in the crisis. The various responses to the genocide show us that it is not always the desire to gain resources or influence that determines a course of action—it can just as easily be the inability to understand what another nation is losing.
Barker, Greg. "Interview General Romeo Dallaire." Ghosts of Rwanda. PBS, 1 April 2004. Web. 10 September 2011.
Des Forges, Alison L. “Shame: Rationalizing Western Apathy in Rwanda.” Foreign Affairs 79.3 (2000): 141- 44. Print.
Ferroggiaro, William. "The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994." National Security
Archive. Web. 15 Sept. 2011.
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Power, Samantha. “Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States let the Rwandan
Tragedy Happen.” The Atlantic Online. September 2001. Web. 10 September
2011.
"Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened." BBC News. 18 Dec. 2008. Web. 14 Sept. 2011.
Simons, Marlisle. "French Troops Enter Rwanda in Aid Mission." The New York Times.
24 June 1994. Web. 10 Sept. 2011.
I firmly disagree that the Rwandan genocide did not represent a failure in reciprocity. Just because Rwandan was a third world nation, because it was undeveloped and little was expected of it, does not mean that reciprocity was not applicable. Again, reciprocity is about the carrot and stick. Some sort of punishment could have been given to Rwanda when the genocide began, and incentives could have been offered to convince them to stop it. More aggressive attempts at mediation could have been applied.
ReplyDeleteNow the point could be raised, and if this is what you were saying than I do agree with this, that Rwanda was a failure in reciprocity in that it was not even applied- the failure was in the application. I am hesitant on whether reciprocity would have worked if it was applied, but the real failure is in that the UN did not even try reciprocity, they just sat on their hindquarters and watched a genocide unfold. To act and fail is better than merely allow things like Rwanda to occur
Again, this is Sean
Dear Radiant Blogger (Sean),
ReplyDeleteI'm not arguing that Rwanda was not a failure in reciprocity. I'm arguing that in refusing to intervene, reciprocity was not the main underlying motivation. Nations had very limited motivation to engage in "carrot and stick" negotiations or actions because Rwanda, regardless of third world nation status, didn't have much to offer in the way of "what's in it for me." Yes, punishments could have been set when the genocide began, but the failure to do so is the product of a lack of identity--a lack of ability to put the greater good over one's own concerns. Hope that strings together my thinking for you
I think the interesting dimension that you are both bringing out is that, just as with the Realists' concepts of 'power' and 'fungibility,' we can see in reciprocity's carrots and sticks a kind of sliding scale in which some kinds of states are more coercable than others. Put plainly: a globally connected, high-tech state with many connections to other states is easier to bribe and threaten with sanctions than an autarky or a state that simply has little to gain and everything to lose from 'playing ball' when the survival of its regime is at stake.
ReplyDeleteNext week, we'll look at the so-called 'Bloody Edges of Democracy' - i.e., the tendency of the cluster of liberal democracies which form the core of the world economy to fight quite viciously with the illiberal/nondemocracies which surround them. In part, this is because of the very phenomenon you are discussing here.
Sean, I agree that Rwanda represents a failure of reciprocity insofar as any attempt at solving the problem via reciprocity did not occur.
ReplyDeleteBe that as it may, I agree with the assessment Caroline has made with regards to why it is that the UN and the US did not intervene. Perhaps the reason that most developed countries did nothing was, as Caroline suggested, because of a failure to identify with the Rwandans and the problem they were facing. As a result of this lack of identity - and inability to see the full extent of the severity of what was happening until after the fact - countries never even made it to the point where they felt they should try to end the conflict through incentives or punishments.
Caroline, I think that you managed to provide an explanation for not only why the UN and the US did not intervene and the genocide was allowed to occur, but also for why it is that these countries did not even attempt to employ reciprocity.