Sunday, October 9, 2011

Explaining Nasserism

Thus far we have discussed realist, liberal and social theories of international relations. Social theories are more abstract than the other two and are used to explain states’ irrational decisions that neither power nor reciprocity can interpret satisfactorily. Nasserism, which swept through the Middle East in the 1950s and peaked in the late 1960s, is a movement for which social theory, or identity, seems to be the best analytical lens. Nasserism was an ideological and political movement, lead by the former president of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser, which called for the establishment of a pan-Arab state. By analyzing the ideology and actions related to Nasserism, one can see that neither power nor reciprocity expound the movement; this leaves identity as the next possible explanation.


First, let us look at the core aspects of the ideology of pan-Arabism under Nasser. As described by Fathi El-Shihibi, a professor of Arabic culture, Islam and Arab and American comparative history, literature and culture, “the trinity of Pan-Arab Nationalism according to his predecessor and the founder of Modern Arab Nationalism Jamal Abd al-Nasser includ[ed] liberty, social justice and unity.” The liberty El-Shihibi refers to was freedom from the western imperialism that had characterized the Middle East since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. This also included destroying the state of Israel, which Nasser saw as a western imperial nation. To Nasserists, social justice meant expanding “Arab socialism” in the region. Nasser was adamantly opposed to the disproportionate distribution of wealth in Arab countries but also opposed pure communism. As the name suggests, pan-Arabism called for the unification of the states on the Arab Peninsula. Though this ideology became popular under Nasser’s leadership, as El-Shihibi explains, it had roots in former centuries, “Pan-Arabism was not simply a new secular phenomenon molded by the Arab-Christian Michel Aflaq (1910-1989) and the Arab-Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1912-1980) and later championed by the Egyptian President Jamal Abd al-Nasser (1918-1970) but actually predated Islam by many centuries.” Though pan-Arabism predated pan-Islamism, the desire for a united Islamic country, they are closely related ideologies; both movements attempted to unite similar geographic areas. The differences being that pan-Arabism was secular and appealed to non-Muslims, and pan-Islamism was based on the life of the prophet Muhammad and appealed to non-Arab Muslims. The reasons for pan-Arabism described above do not reflect realist or liberal ideas. Nasserism, though it had territorial goals, was about uniting a people through common identity more than gaining military or economic power over a region or international influence.


Even when Nasser used military force in 1956 and 1967, his reasons for doing so were focused on the Arab identity more than power. In 1956 “Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal...Nasser’s action was an act of revenge against the British and the French, who had perviously held control of the company that controlled the Canal. This conflict precipitated an international crisis over ownership of the Suez Canal” (McDermott). Though Nasser’s action caused a quasi-war, nationalizing the canal was intended to boost the morale of the Arab people and served to accomplish one of the ideological goals of Nasserism, freedom from the western imperialism. In 1967, Nasser was again involved in military conflict, but this time against Israel. Moshe Gat, a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, describes the mentality behind the assertion of military power, “Nasser was engaged in a disingenuous political manoeuvre intended to score a political victory over Israel similar to the one achieved in the Suez conflict, but, this time, without recourse to war.” Though a series of displays of power lead to the beginning of the Six-Day War, identity, or social theory, provides the best explanation as to why these military moves were made. Nasser acted as though he was prepared for war, specifically by moving troops into the Sinai, but he was doing so to serve an ideological goal, destroying Israel, which Nasser considered a western pawn. Militarily, Nasser had little reason to push Israel to the brink of war, and eventually past it. He, as well as his allies, namely Jordan and Syria, risked war to serve a core part of the ideology of Nasserism.


Liberal theory also fails to provide an explanation for the ideology and actions of Nasser and his followers. The only international organization involved with the course of the pan-Arab movement under Nasser was the Arab League. (After the war in 1967, the U.N. became involved in attempts to resolve the issues caused by Israel’s victory, but Nasser was no longer a regional power at that time.) “By the late 1950s the Arab League had come to consist largely of variants of pan-Arab and secular nationalist regimes, led by Egypt, which was, as it happened, also the very host-country of the League” (Sheikh). This international organization was inconsequential because it was under Nasser’s control. There was no pressure from the Arab League on Nasserists because it was a collection of states united under the ideology of pan-Arabism.


Nasserism is a case in which realism and liberalism fail to explain the actions of a state, or group of states. The aspects of the movement which at first glance seem like power and reciprocity still connect back to identity. The ideology of pan-Arabism draws on the common ethnic identity of Arabs. The goals of the movement were based on Arab pride and a desire for unity. This rationale explains the actions of Nasserists, which when viewed through realist and liberal lenses seem irrational.


Works Cited

Gat, Moshe. "Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: A Premeditated Strategy or An Inexorable Drift to War?" Israel Affairs 11.4 (2005): 608-35. Paul Bogdanor. Web. 07 Oct. 2011. <http://www.paulbogdanor.com/israel/gat1967.pdf>.

McDermott, Rose. "Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy." Google Books. Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://books.google.com/books?id=MOBdwHpRvC0C>.

Sheikh, Naveed S. "The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States ." Google Books. Web. 08 Oct. 2011. <http://books.google.com/books?id=X81XwztJH5EC>.

El-Shihibi, Fathi. "Journey of Arab Revolutions From Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism to Pan-Secularism." Global Politician: News, Interviews, Opinions and Analysis. Web. 07 Oct. 2011. <http://www.globalpolitician.com/print.asp?id=6864>.

9 comments:

  1. I found your comments on pan-Arabism very interesting because I believe that it can explain many of the behaviors in states that have persisted into their modern politics. However, the Arab Spring has certainly overturned many norms in Middle Eastern politics. Do you think the recent revolution will mark a departure or return to the idea of "Nasserism"?

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  2. I think that Nasserism was a modern revival of the panArab idea. It was a failure, and because of that many people lost faith in the viability of panArabism in any form. I think that the Arab Spring united the feelings of many Arabs, but not in a way that will revive calls for a panArab state. I am not saying the ideology is dead, though I think panIslamism might be more relevant than panArabism in the future, but I think in terms of the Arab Spring, panArabism is a nonissue because people are fighting for individual rights and for reforms in specific states.

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  3. I found your paper very interesting because I am not familiar with the concept of Nasserism. Building off of what Sagatom said if you think there is a chance of returning to either panArabism or panIslamism. Do you think it would help or hurt Middle East relations? I think you are right in assuming that Nasserism is an act of identity and a means to unite against western expansion. Do you think if this was to occur it would help bring Middle Eastern countries together and would create peace or do you think it would lead to more conflict because it would further alienate the members from the group who have stronger relations with Western countries?

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  4. Nasserism itself will never exist again. It was largely shaped by the Cold War atmosphere and Nasser's personality, which are things of the past. I think panArabism is unlikely to gain a large following again because when Nasser was leading the movement most Arab countries had never been independent. The Ottoman Empire controlled much of the region for around six centuries. After the empire fell, western countries set up imperial and later puppet governments in the regions. Due to the lack of national history, panArabism was appealing. Now that Arab countries have existed independently, I doubt they will unite due to shared ethnic identity in the near future. I think panIslamism still might appeal to many Muslims because it is based on the traditions of the prophet Muhammad because under his reign the Islamic people were united in one country. I cannot say whether this kind of unity would help or hurt relations with the west. PanIslamism is a religious movement so I assume the government of such a state would be a religious one. I think it depends on whether it was a radical or just religious government. If it was radical, that would hurt relations. f it was just religious it is hard to say. Under panIslamism nonMuslims are the ones alienated. I think Christian Arabs would have the biggest problem with this rather than people with connections to the west. PanIslamism is not inherently anti-western. It is about uniting the Muslim people in one nation. The ideology itself does not reference the west. That would depend on the sentiments of the people in power.

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  5. The factors of liberty and social justice, which contributed to Nasserism, still seem to exist today. Much of the Middle East perceives the west as meddling imperialists, and large class division still exist. If Nasserism- a combination of personality, socialism, and group identity- is dead, then what will replaced it as a political movement to express these grievances? PanIslamism could certainly be considered as a nationalist reaction against western control. Do you think that PanIslamism, or just Islamic movements in general, will take up the issues that Nasserism addressed, or will another movement take those issues?

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  6. Yes, some of Nasser's main concerns are still issues today. The reason Nasserism will never rise again exactly as it was are 1) because Nasser is dead and 2) because in the end it failed. Like I said, panArabism could become a big movement again, but I don't foresee that in the near future. I cannot tell you what ideology or movement will rise next in the Middle East, no one can. As I said, I think that panIslamism is a possibility, but for now I think in individual revolutions that constitute the Arab Spring are the predominant force. I agree that panIslamism can be used to react against western presence in the Middle East, some radical Islamists have tried to use it in such a way, but that is not the core aspect of the ideology. It is about uniting the Muslim people under one state. The main reasoning behind it is not to keep out the west, but to follow the example of the life of the prophet Muhammad under whom there was one Muslim state. So to give you a simple answer, I don't know that the next big movement in the Middle East will be; for now I'm just watching the course of the movements in the Arab Spring.

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  7. I think your point was well made, Jenny Sue! When you referenced liberalism, you only referenced liberal institutionalism. When you said that only one international organization was involved in Nasserism, is that because Nasser reached out to the international community, and only one body responded, or is it because Nasser specifically asked for the help of only the Arab League? Do you think that you can widen the argument by saying that Nasser wasn't working toward democracy--that he was working for identity, but without needing to compromise his own power? Was his strategy simply liberty (from western imperialism) and social justice? Or are there any of his own motives behind it?

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  8. Nasser did not really reach out to the Arab League. Egypt was already a part of the league and the organization sort of bowed to his wishes. It was fair inconsequential. Nasser didn't want to be involved with the west, so he made to effort to interact with institutions connected to western nations, which was the vast majority. Nasser was definitely power hungry. His goal was to lead a panArab state, but I do think he cared about the cause. It's true that Nasser was not a democratic leader and he did not make strong calls for democracy, though some supporters of his said his reforms laid the groundwork for future democracy.

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  9. Sorry, that was supposed to say "fairly inconsequential."

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