Dominance, Reciprocity and Identity in the Basque Country

In the Basque Country of Spain, ethnic roots and a strong sense of nationalism run deep throughout the population. Much of this pride in the Basque heritage and identity can be commended because it has encouraged the spread and flourishing of Basque culture around the world. However, there are also ways in which some Basque citizens demonstrate their pride, and some their longing for independence, which are dangerous and sometimes deadly. One of the most widely known facts about the Basque nationalist movement is the existence of ETA, an extreme separatist organization that uses violence to make its cause known. There has been and still is a continuous blend of power, reciprocity, and identity in the Basque country, and it doesn’t look like it’s going to change anytime soon.

Dominance has mainly been a struggle between the Spanish national government and ETA, along with other groups that support Basque independence. ETA (pronounced “etta”), an acronym of the Basque language expression meaning Basque Homeland and Freedom, is a nationalist group that is considered a terrorist organization by the European Union and the United States. Founded in 1959 during the harsh regime of dictator Francisco Franco, the formation of ETA was mainly a reaction to the brutal oppression of Basque culture under Franco’s rule. The repression started with the attack on the Basque town of Guernica and the decimation of Basque armed forces, and continued with Franco’s severe ban on the use of the Basque language and cultural identity in general. The incredible oppression led to a build-up of resentment and frustration that eventually boiled over into anger and hate, and enough motivation to take drastic action. ETA became an armed resistance force in 1968 when they killed a member of the Guardia Civil. Their most high-profile killing under Franco was in 1973, when members assassinated Franco’s Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco (Woodworth 5). Since the establishment of this tradition of violence, ETA has become notorious throughout Spain and the world for its high rates of killing Spanish generals and political officials, especially in 1980, when ETA was responsible for 91 deaths. They have killed more than 800 people in total, including innocent civilians, through assassinations and bombings in Madrid airports and various public places in Spain. The numbers have decreased in recent years, but despite the autonomous power granted to Basques in the democratic Spanish constitution of 1978, ETA continues to commit acts of violence.

The deceivingly complex question of why ETA would continue acting violently if they have been granted autonomy has several answers in which dominance, reciprocity and identity overlap. While the Basque Country’s regional government does have a significant amount of power, some citizens (especially nationalists) argue that their freedoms are still restricted and they are unable to politically advance some projects that they would be able to if they were an independent nation (Woodworth 3). There is also a partly psychological angle of identity that stems from the oppression that was inflicted on the Basques in the time of Franco’s power. As the father of one ETA prisoner put it, “Franco made us nationalists by his persecution” (Woodworth 4). The Basque people were so wounded by this oppression that the effects are being seen decades later in the mentality of the oppressed generation and their children. Some are convinced that “anything less than full independence…would spell the end of their cultural, linguistic, and national identity within a very short time” (Woodworth 9). It’s almost a form of paranoia directly inflicted by Franco’s repression. The dominance asserted by Franco in an attempt to gain total power and devotion to his regime ultimately failed, causing a decline then a surge in Basque nationalism, and also prompting a counteraction of a Basque quest for dominance in the form of ETA.

As guilty as he was, Franco has not been the only culprit of provoking ETA and looking for dominance. The Spanish Socialist government in the 1980s employed a strategy of “dirty war” and had an antiterrorist group kill 27 people with the aim of wiping out ETA leaders (Woodworth 8). Unfortunately, about a third of people killed by the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación were ordinary citizens. The killing of innocent people by the government backfired and gave ETA justification for their violence.

Amid all the violence, there have been sporadic negotiations and attempts for peace. However, the government generally refuses to negotiate with ETA officials on matters of Basque self-government and rights until ETA is willing to completely give up their position as an armed organization (Gupta 347). The carrot-and-stick method has had no effect, since ETA has never expressed interest in totally disarming. ETA has declared ceasefires and broken them four times – 1989, 1996, 1998, and 2006. In 2011 they declared a "permanent and general" ceasefire that would be “open to verification by international observers” (Tremlett). But this did not seem to affect Madrid’s bleak outlook on relations with the organization. It seems they no longer trust ETA’s word, and it’s hard to blame them for it considering all the failed attempts at negotiating to end the violence and broken ceasefires. Reciprocity seems to have failed as a solution to ending ETA’s violence, as ETA officials and the state have come to a stalemate on this point.

Although the Spanish government is being necessarily cautious and wary about this latest ceasefire, that does not mean there is no room for hope. The 2011 ceasefire is an unprecedented move for ETA in that it volunteers it to be internationally recognized and permanent. Perhaps identity will end up being the IR principle that leads to the solution to finding an end to ETA’s violence, if this ceasefire indicates a desire of theirs to work towards the common good of the Basque people and Spanish citizens.

Since dominance, reciprocity and identity are all intertwined in the turbulent political and social situation of this small region, only time will tell what kind of combination of the three will result in a solution to the long-ongoing issue of the terrorism of ETA. It is difficult to predict what will happen because it depends on how durable this “permanent” ceasefire will be, and only if ETA is peaceful long enough to convince the government to negotiate will there be any sort of progress.

Works Cited:

Gupta, Devashree. “Selective Engagement and Its Consequences for Social Movement Organizations: Lessons from British Policy in Northern Ireland.” Comparative Politics 39 (2007) : 331-351. JSTOR. Web. 18 September 2011.

Tremlett, Giles. “Eta declares permanent ceasefire.” The Guardian. 10 January 2011. Web. 18 September 2011.

Woodworth, Paddy. “Why Do They Kill? The Basque Conflict in Spain.” World Policy Journal 18 (2001) : 1-12. JSTOR. Web. 18 September 2011.