The Palestine Bid for Statehood and Liberalism

The creation of a Palestinian state has been one of the most pressing issues in international relations since the creation of Israel in 1948. In that year following the Second World War, the British, at the end of their empire, withdrew from the mandate (here meaning “colony”) of Palestine. The United Nations, which was chartered in 1945, partitioned the area into an Arab state and a Jewish state (what is now Israel). However, this arrangement was rejected by the Arabs (namely the Arab League). Shortly after Israel was admitted into the United Nations on May 11, 1948, Arab military forces attempted an invasion of the young Jewish state on May 15. The military force consisted of Egyptians, Iraqis, Transjordanians, Syrians, Lebanese and a small number of Saudi Arabian and Yemeni troops. Every state except Saudi Arabia and Yemen committed several thousand troops each to the assault. It is no exaggeration that Israel claims it was attacked from all sides in what is now known to them as the Israeli War of Independence and to the rest of the world as the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Israel not only repelled its invaders, but also annexed much of what was to be the Arab state of Palestine as defined by the United Nations. The only parts of Palestine that remained Arab were the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

In 1967 after Arab-Israeli relations once again broke down, Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Israel successfully defeated the combined Arab armies and taken control of the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula (which was later returned under the terms of the Camp David Accords in 1978) from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and East Jerusalem (which was previously annexed by Jordan). By the end of the war, over one million Palestinians in the occupied territories came under Israeli rule and hundreds of thousands more became refugees. These conflicts have set overwhelming precedent for discord in the region between the state of Israel and Palestinian factions.

Though Israel has withdrawn from the Gaza Strip, there has been an enormous push in the Arab world for the creation of a Palestinian state. In fact, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has recently put a bid for the recognition of an independent Palestinian state. Even though United Nations Security Council is meeting today to debate the issue, Abbas’ request has been viewed as largely symbolic since the United States has vowed to veto such a bid. President Obama has stated that while he is in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state, he stipulates that Israel must be part of the process.

While the Palestinian bid for statehood will probably not result in the creation of a Palestine, it is still of considerable interest in the field of international relations. The United Nations and the idea of self-determination are the bread and butter of liberal perspective. One may ask how they could fail to create the state of Palestine when applied together. The answer lies in the ideas of liberalism itself.

Liberal Institutionalism, a branch of liberalism, is grounded in the idea that international institutions provide collective security. Collective security is the notion that when states cooperate they can provide greater security and protection for each other than any can provide for themselves individually. Collective security and by extension Liberal Institutionalism is exemplified by the United Nations, which exists for the expressed purpose “to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security” as stated in the preamble of its charter. Herein lies the answer to why the United Nations would deny self-determination to a democratic administration. An independent Palestine would create a significant security problem in the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the United Nations about the Palestinian bid for statehood, remarking that Abbas is pursuing a “state without peace” and that Palestinians are armed not only with “hopes and dreams" (a phrased used by Abbas when he addressed the United Nations), but with "10,000 missiles, and Grad rockets supplied by Iran, not to mention the river of lethal weapons flowing into Gaza." It would remiss to not note that the Gaza Strip is currently governed by Hamas, which has been recognized as a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union.

Abbas’ statehood attempt perfectly outlines a collective goods problem in the world today. It would be in the best interest of both Israel and the Palestinian people come to a two-state solution and both parties have expressed this fact. However, neither party trusts the other and therefore an agreement has not yet been reached. To resolve the issue, both Israel and the United States favor reciprocity in pursuit of a Palestinian state rather than bypassing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and going directly to the United Nations. Reciprocity in international relations simply states that every favorable and unfavorable action by a state should be returned in kind. In this situation, reciprocity entails a series of treaties and discussions to create a two-state solution in which Israel is recognized as a Jewish state. Essentially, Israel demands that the Palestinians scratch its back and guarantee its security before it returns the favor and recognizes their statehood.

Ironically, what is blocking liberalism from effectively creating a Palestinian state is Palestinian state. The United Nations cannot act upon the principle of self-determination without creating a collective security problem for Israel and the Middle East and violating the principle of reciprocity in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. So an obvious question remains: where do we go on from here? While the Palestinian bid for statehood does not necessitate a failure of liberalist theory, the fact remains that sixty-three years have passed and there is still not a Palestine. When the President Abbas approached the United Nations I imagine that he was thinking, “If not now, when?” While the United States and Israel press for reciprocity in the form of concessions and peace talks, it clearly has not worked in the six decades it has been applied. Palestine cannot be faulted for trying a different avenue of statehood.

Sources

CIA World Factbook: Israel

UN.org: UN Milestones

GlobalSecurity.org: Israeli War of Independence

Encyclopedia Britannica: Six-Days War 

United Nations Charter

Robert Gibbs Talk

William Vazquez

Professor Craig

World Politics 001H

Date of Submission: 25 September 2011

No matter how avid we are in our pursuit to be as knowledgeable as we can be about the world, it seems there is always something or someone important that just happens to slip one’s mind. The pressing matters of our personal lives often make all else seem insignificant in comparison. So when I passed a poster mentioning how Robert Gibbs would be speaking on campus, my immediate reaction was not as great as that of my more politically focused colleagues. My curiosity was peaked, however, so I ventured over to the Mary Graydon Center only to find that the room was completely packed. Downtrodden but not deterred, I persisted in waiting to see if I could get inside or just catch a glimpse of this man of power I never knew. To my luck, the speakers outside managed to function, and, situated under one of them, I proceeded to grasp at every bit of information I could.

Mr. Gibbs was the 28th White House Press Secretary. He has worked as communications director for then-U.S. Senator Barack Obama and later Obama's 2008 presidential campaign. Gibbs, who has worked with Obama since 2004, has been busy for quite some time, having previously worked as press secretary of John Kerry's 2004 presidential campaign, and has specialized in Senate campaigns, serving as communications director for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and for four individual Senate campaigns. On November 22, 2008, Gibbs was announced as the press secretary of the Obama administration. He assumed the role of press secretary on January 20, 2009. He retired from this position on February 11, 2011, stating before this that: "The best service I can provide this president is, for the next couple of years, outside this building.”

During his visit here on the American University campus, Mr. Gibbs took the time to review some of the most pressing matters he dealt with during his time working in the Obama administration, his opinion on the complexity of delivering information and the expansion of technological capabilities, the upcoming election in 2012, and some of his own words of advice. He opened with plenty of personal anecdotes pertaining to what he believed were the worst issues: the debt crisis, the Christmas bomber, and above all, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. He claimed that of all the briefings he ever sat through, the oil briefings were the toughest, and as a result he quipped that he now has a wealth of knowledge on oil containment similar if not equal to that of an oil C.E.O. He even quoted himself after the top hat that was applied to the oil leak was knocked off by a robotic camera arm as saying, “If what you’re telling me is a joke, someone is getting fired today.” His ease with this information made him seem all the more trustworthy in his words.

For all of his pinpointed facts and figures, Gibbs seemed to make many general statements rather than divulge too much into a divisive issue. He came off as very lighthearted in his responses, which apparently seemed to be his strategy in connecting with the changing scope of the modern world. As times have changed, technology has advanced, and globalization has interconnected most if not all of the world in various ways. The speed and variety of distributed information is now extremely quick. He pointed out how many older forms of news collection have declined even in the last year, and that over sixty-five million Americans today own a Smart phone. While this expansion allows for more information to be distributed at a faster pace, this can have a negative aspect as well. For while the appearance of President Obama on talk shows with Jay Leno and Ellen DeGeneres may have made him seem more personable, it was also seen as “not presidential” and “not serious.” The media’s focus on the most negative occurrences in the world generally has no benefit besides the profit of that industry. Take the Koran burning earlier this year that, if it had not been caught by the mass media, would have been of barely any significance. Instead it resulted in the storming of a US embassy in Afghanistan with many being killed in the process. On top of that, there was a time when Charlie Sheen and his raucous activities overshadowed all the horrors that had been occurring in Libya and the increasing outcry against Muammar Qaddafi. While it is “enormously important and good that we are all interconnected” as Mr. Gibbs put it, this does not amount to much when the people that keep us connected choose to focus more on a washed-up actor’s drug-induced cries for attention rather than one of the most significant changes in the Arab region the world has ever seen.

Mr. Gibbs claimed he was fascinated by how heated the campaigns for the Republican national ticket position have been even while the election is still in its infancy. He marveled at how Rick Perry’s entrance completely eclipsed Michelle Bachmann’s meteoric rise in popularity and firmly believed either Mr. Perry or Mitt Romney will be facing President Obama at the polls next November. Despite the many pressing matters that have been plaguing our country as of late, he believed that the economy will be the top issue, and that ultimately the central question for the race will be: What will the US look like in about five years and how will it change?

Mr. Gibbs also passed on several words of advice for those seeking to one day be in a position like he holds, pointing out that he started out interning in Congress in his sophomore year. He recommended seeking out as many different places as possible, which with the number of organizations available right here in Washington, D.C, should not be difficult. He stated that “nothing perpetuates democracy like getting involved,” especially with the vote. He also stated that “life and happiness are measured not by material things but by actions.”

During the Question and Answer session, I couldn’t help but expect a response mechanism similar to that of many politicians and characterized by something I once heard in a documentary about former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. One quote that has always stuck in my mind is: “Answer the question you wish you had been asked.” In a good portion of his responses I could not help but feel that he would avoid the question even if ever so slightly. One significant question involved when President Obama would take a stand on the issue of gay marriage, to which he started off with the common “Thank you for your passion on the issue” or “That’s a great question.” He surprised me in the heartfelt account of how he viewed the issue in the terms of how his son would grow up seeing the world. He believes that the next generation will live in a world where things we found so radical will not be nearly as divisive, such as a man of African American descent holding the office of President of the United States of America. He also stated that he was an avid fan of Jon Stewart and that his favorite form of media technology in this current age is Twitter.

Overall Robert Gibbs’s talk was quite interesting because it not only covered many of the pressing matters of our current age in the U.S. but it also put a more human perspective on the inner machinations of our nation’s highest office. It served as a chance for Mr. Gibbs to speak freely with some of the general populous rather than be riddled with questions from media personnel. He made sure to state how important it was to get involved and to promote respect and compromise when dealing with those who you do not agree with. Underneath all of these great statements, I could not help but feel a tendency toward idealistic liberalism. With each great statement of promoting compromise came the undertone of the disastrous results of not doing so. The statements were not made in a general manner so that they could apply to all involved in the audience, but did not explicitly leave out the larger picture that they envelop. I would not go so far as to say that Mr. Gibbs was negatively representing those in positions of power in Washington, D.C. who blocked a good deal of progress that could have been made so far under the Obama administration, although if he was, his tendency to remain ambiguous covered those tracks. Ultimately as someone who has been in contact with the media for quite some time while defending the image of those he represents, Mr. Gibbs did a great job speaking for himself and for Mr. Obama. His recommendations for a greater focus on the depth of developing issues while they are occurring, such as the oil spill and the Arab Spring, serve not only as great words of wisdom for the media organizations themselves but for each of us developing students striving to be as involved as possible. It makes me wonder though: With our declining attention spans due to the seemingly infinite growth of the knowledge available to us, is it possible for the media to effectively release information in a manner that we will be found permissible by government officials (Gibbs himself had to examine many an article for its security effectiveness), interesting enough by the general populace, and comprehensive enough to capture the entire picture?

Hegemons

Jonathan Beatty

Professor Craig

World Politics 001H

Date of Submission: 21 September 2011

Hegemony is defined in International Relations as “the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the International System, so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and economic relations are conducted.” Currently, the world has a Hegemon, the United States. Past Hegemons have included Great Britain, Napoleon’s France, and the Roman Empire. Hegemons, throughout history, have been extremely successful until the Hegemon falls due to fatal mistakes that could have been avoided. This was present in the Roman Empire when Julius Caesar, wanting too much power in a Hegemonic system, caused opposition which resulted in the loss of his life and the subsequent fall of the Hegemon. Napoleon’s French Hegemon fell when, as a dictator, spread his power and influence too thin resulting in the disaster of the Battle of Waterloo. His subsequent exile meant an end to the French Hegemon. While the French attempted to continue control, the lack of sound economic policy and a weak central government resulted the subsequent fall of the French Hegemon. In the case of the British Hegemon, a flawed economic policy and poor international diplomacy resulted in its fall. Having a Hegemon in the world system provides a police force over the world to keep the actors in check. Without existence of a Hegemon, the world would have trouble economically expanding and globalization would suffer.

The most appropriate example of a Hegemon, before the United States, would be the country of Great Britain. An example of British Hegemon power was the East India Company, which served as an economic arm of the British. The British attempted to secure a monopoly in International Trade by going through the Spice Routes and establishing control over India. Known as the Commonwealth, the British Hegemon effectively ruled the world through the 18^th Century until the last of its major conquests were separated from the Empire with India gaining independence in 1947. As suggested by Dacey and Mirrin in Nineteenth Century Britain as a Subtle Commercial Hegemon, the British also had their superior navy in order to keep the world in check. In theory, the British Hegemon operated well. The leadership was centralized in London, with a Prime Minister and Parliament governing the empire. Even though the Hegemon was governed correctly, the major flaw lied in the economic policies. In order to prevent Power-Transition from occurring, lower actors have to be pleased with their position in the world order. A Hegemon present in the world system is required to deter aggression and promote free trade. By monopolizing trade and conquering territories, the British Empire ended up increasing aggression and creating the opposite of free trade. The British Empire consequently created a monopoly. The rise of other states proved the Power Transition Theory to be accurate. The United States became the current Hegemon after the British Empire entertained poor international economic policies. The United States acquiring the status of a Hegemon is an example of Power Transition Theory.

The United States is as close to an ideal Hegemon more so than any past Hegemon. Under the United States Hegemon, the world has experienced decreased anarchy. This is evidenced from the less severe wars that have occurred between states. While any war is of great sadness, the clear decrease in the severity of lives lost in wars is a testament to the involvement of a strong Hegemon. While aggression still exists among some nation-states, the forms of blatant aggression that were present during the reign of the British Hegemon are not as prevalent. Trade is freer than it has ever been under United States Hegemon. Even though tariffs still exist, globalization has allowed the world to shrink, allowing goods to flow freely from the East to the West and vice-versa. This is a sign of a strong Hegemon. The United States is not a perfect Hegemon. In order to sustain the Hegemon, the United States needs to encourage more unity in the world’s economy. While having a universal currency is only a dream, a more stable economic climate and decreased dependence on non-backed currency would decrease sentiment towards the United States. As Stein suggests in The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order, in order for the world system to stay stable while under a hegemon, the hegemon must provide, “the collective good and extract… the support of others.” The United States provides the collective good of capital to the rest of the world. Where the United States needs to improve is gaining the support of other actors. In order for the United States to remain a successful Hegemon, the United States needs to improve its image in the world public. Increasing sentiment results in decreased power of the Hegemon. If the United States is able to fix the issues presented, it should be able to continue to rule as a successful Hegemon.

Having a Hegemon in the world brings about a decreased sense of anarchy, less aggression, and free trade. In the six decades that the United States has existed as the Hegemon, the world, as a whole, has improved. While economic crises and wars have persisted, they have been less severe. The United States, as a Hegemon, has brought about a more balanced world.

Resources:

The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order

Arthur A. Stein

International Organization
Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 355-386

Published by: The MIT Press

Nineteenth Century Britain as a Subtle Commercial Hegemon

Raymond Dacey and Kevin P. Murrin

Synthese
Vol. 113, No. 2 (Nov., 1997), pp. 205-216

Published by: Springer

International Relations – Chapter 2

International Relations – Page 506

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/88114/Julius-Caesar

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/402943/Napoleon-I

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/176643/East-India-Company

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/80013/British-Empire

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/648813/World-War-II

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/870845/Iraq-War

Reciprocity, Identity, Power: The US and France in Libya

Around 17 February 2011, protests opposing the regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi broke out in Libya, marking the beginning of its civil war, and adding it to the list of countries to take part in what has already come to be known as the Arab Spring. As in Egypt and Tunisia before, protestors aimed to overthrow the government; unlike in these other two countries, however, the revolution in Libya was not quick, and instead devolved into civil war. By 20 February, protests had spread to the capital, Tripoli; the death toll quickly reached the thousands. On 17 March, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, and allowed for any measures necessary to be taken in protection of civilians. The US, France, and the United Kingdom intervened two days later with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces; the intervention was soon joined by a coalition of twenty-seven European and Middle Eastern states.

Upon taking a closer look at the US, French, and British intervention, an atypical course of events becomes apparent. For once it was not the US that jumped immediately into the fight; in fact it was France, along with Britain, that led the effort to aid Libyan rebels in ousting Gaddafi. This represents a markedly different order of business from recent policy history, both for the US and France. After all, people from various countries around the world tend to hold an image of America as the hegemon, nosing its way into other countries’ business without invitation – and the recent past of US foreign policy does little to dispute this notion (Damerow).

This image stems partly from the frequent use of preventative war during the presidency of George W. Bush, as part of US foreign policy under the “Bush Doctrine.” The policy holds that the US should depose foreign regimes that represent a perceived threat to national security, and that the US should attempt to spread democracy in the Middle East as an anti-terrorism strategy. In effect, this was the policy followed in beginning the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq – wars which have lasted for years, and have cost America billions of dollars and thousands of soldiers. The Doctrine, for better or worse, has defined American foreign policy for some years. However, when civil war broke out in Libya, the US did not immediately step in. Rather, the Obama Administration decided that it would not intervene without first establishing a multilateral coalition.

Such a coalition was made possible through the aforementioned UN Resolution 1973, which provided the intervention with international legitimacy. For once, other countries – this time France and Britain – requested US aid; it was only after this had occurred that the Obama Administration agreed to take on a supporting role in the operation, which was intended to be more humanitarian than militant. The role was supporting in that, after the initial air strikes, the US took a back seat and instead allowed its NATO partners to continue the intervention. Some have speculated that this new style of intervention could mark a new era in US foreign policy, an era in which the US acts as part of a coalition, and waits for requests for support from the local populace of the country in conflict, before stepping in (Zakaria).

At the other end of the spectrum in terms of reaction to the Libyan conflict was France which, along with Britain, led in the call for sanctions against, and intervention in, Libya. But why did France jump to the forefront in this conflict? Following the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, the French government took criticism for failing to react quickly (Fraser). Furthermore, former French foreign minister Michelle Alliot-Marie was found to have been vacationing in Tunisia, and to have had ties to the family of the deposed Tunisian president. Unsurprisingly, this cast her in a questionable light and in no way helped the image of the French government, nor that of President Sarkozy. Mr. Sarkozy has taken criticism for his government’s foreign policy for many years; as a result, jumping to the lead in the Libyan intervention has been viewed by some as an attempt to restore credibility and improve image on the part of the French government (Fraser).

The principles of power, identity, and – most importantly – reciprocity, can be used to explore the reactions of the US and France to the conflict in Libya. In waiting for the formation of a multilateral coalition prior to engaging in Libya, the Obama Administration did not play the usual card of dominating a conflict by power alone. Rather, a reciprocal relationship was sought out and, once established, the US was able to collaborate with its fellow NATO members in order to share the burden in assisting Libya. This way, the US was not getting itself into yet another conflict where American intervention was unwanted by both local peoples and the American public.

The US’s role was clearly established as that of a partner in a joint effort, rather than as the leader of the operation, which helped to stem criticism, both domestically and internationally (Zakaria). The Obama Administration was, as a result, able to make the argument that American involvement in the intervention was justified (Cortright). The US was not stepping in where it had no business; rather, once asked by its NATO allies, it was simply doing its duty to assist a country that also wanted its help. After all, it would have been hypocritical to publically condemn Gaddafi for the way in which he was murdering his citizens and then, when asked to assist in preventing further civilian casualties, do nothing at all. Making such an argument in order to gain domestic support for the intervention appealed to the American sense of identity; part of American pride has to do with viewing the United States as a steward of freedom and human rights. When both are being violated, and American help has been sought out, how can the country say no without going against all that it, as a nation, stands for? Furthermore, in portraying the intervention as a humanitarian, rather than military, effort, the Obama Administration and the other NATO nations were able to garner stronger international support for the cause through appealing to a greater sense of identity.

France, likewise, used reciprocity in its Libya strategy, albeit to a slightly different end. Whereas the US waited until a UN Resolution had been passed and its assistance requested before acting, France jumped much more quickly into action. Soon after the Libyan civil war got underway, France began to call for sanctions. The sanctions were an attempt to persuade Gaddafi to step down and end the fighting; they would be lifted once the conflict had ceased.

The way in which France immediately aligned itself with Britain and the US in its intervention effort demonstrates its use of reciprocity in what could potentially be a new era of multilateralism for the county. During the years prior to the crisis in Libya, France’s influence in Europe had seen a steady decline; this alliance allowed for France reaffirm its power and play a key role in the intervention without carrying all of the weight of the effort solo (Borger). However, by virtue of being at the forefront of the call for intervention, France sought to appeal to French identity in order to help restore the government’s image domestically. As French national identity has much to do with how it is perceived internationally, playing a leading role in the coalition shows France in a favorable light, as a world power, and thus gains the government support from the people (Borger). Through calling for action and leading the intervention, France showed that it does indeed have weight in the international playing field, and is able to use its power as a developed European nation in order to take part in the organization and execution of a multilateral effort.

Because the Libya crisis showcased a departure from what’s come to be seen as the norm for both the United States and France with regards to international conflict, one key question remains: Will the way in which both countries responded mark a shift in foreign policy? It is possible that policy in the US will become less about exercising dominance, and more about using reciprocity in order to establish multilateral coalitions with support garnered through a shared sense of identity, in order to resolve international conflicts. And perhaps policy in France will shift to reflect the use of reciprocity in order to establish greater power in the world, and a stronger sense of national identity.

It is as yet too early to know for sure whether the Obama Administration’s response to Libya will become a new “Obama Doctrine” of foreign policy. At the present, the strategy employed appears to have worked; however, some critics of the Administration’s response have argued that, had the US intervened more fully and more quickly, the conflict in Libya may have ended sooner and with less bloodshed (Ezzatyar). It is impossible to know if this really would have been the case, or if the US would have found itself entrenched in yet another unpopular war on foreign soil.

An eye will also have to be kept on France in order to determine whether or not their foreign policy has seen a shift. It will be interesting to see how the apparent success of the Libya intervention affects the popularity of President Sarkozy and the public opinion of the government, as well as perceived national identity. It is possible that the way in which Mr. Sarkozy jumped into action will gain him some support and help to restore the image of the French government. However, it is also possible that, even if the Libya effort gained some favor among the French people, it will not be enough to win Mr. Sarkozy re-election. Monitoring approval polls, and the results of the coming French elections, will likely give some indication as to the French public’s response to its government’s success in Libya.

Works Cited

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