Peace Corps and Politics: An Unfortunate Mix

On November 22, 1963, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was shot and killed in Dallas, Texas, only two and a half years after he had created the Peace Corps. Following the death of President Kennedy, the Corps began to conflict with following presidents, mainly over the very purpose and foundation of the organization itself. Two separate visions emerged: one centered on the Peace Corps as a government agency effecting US foreign policy and the other centered on the Peace Corps as an independent apolitical organization committed to third world development. In general, the White House and the federal government championed the former view, while the Corps and the volunteers who composed it championed the latter. The conflict over whether or not the Peace Corps should be political is one which has determined its effectiveness over the years. As demonstrated by two case studies – Ethiopia in the late sixties/early seventies and Honduras during the eighties – whether or not the actual mission itself is apolitical is irrelevant so long as the Peace Corps volunteers function in an apolitical environment. This apolitical environment is a key element in determining the success of a Peace Corps mission.  

In examining the relationship between a political environment and the success of a Peace Corps mission, Ethiopia and Honduras provide two strong case studies. Both are politically controversial missions, though for different reasons. In Ethiopia, volunteers inadvertently contributed to a revolution that ultimately resulted in the ejection of the Peace Corps from the entire country. In Honduras, the Reagan agenda and focus on Central America caused a massive injection of volunteers into the country, substantially blurring the independence of the Corps from governmental foreign policy. The failure of the program in Ethiopia, when contrasted with the success of that in Honduras, provide effective studies through which to analyze the effect of politics on the success of Peace Corps missions.

From 1930 to 1974, Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie I, who kept the country one of the world’s poorest and least educated throughout his reign. In 1968, Ethiopia resembled a medieval feudal society, with seventy percent of citizens living as tenant sharecroppers. America exercised massive influence in the country with large aid programs, one of the larger being education. The Peace Corps played an important part in this focus on education: in 1965, there were 450 volunteers teaching in Ethiopian secondary schools.  Americans taught the students to question authority, to think independently, to analyze rather than accept. In the dictatorial rule of Selassie, these thoughts were subversive.

Those same students began striking in 1969, eventually focusing their protests on the overthrow of Selassie’s government. One of the issues that protesters clung to was Selassie’s ties with foreigners, mainly American. Thus, as the strikes progressed and grew so did anti-American sentiment, dramatically shrinking the number of volunteers in Ethiopia, down to 100 in 1971. Finally, in 1974 the strikes exploded, as the military joined them on the streets, and Selassie was overthrown. A new anti-American government was set up, and in 1977 the Corps terminated the program in Ethiopia, due to political instability.

It is clear that the Peace Corps program in Ethiopia was political, if not intentionally. Peace Corps programs in Ethiopia were almost exclusively educational, which to some extent was a political choice, tied in with Selassie’s strong desire to modernize his country. The Peace Corps in Ethiopia served to politically awaken and radicalize students throughout the country. Volunteers encouraged their charges to think independently of the state, exposing them to materials that either implicitly criticized the state or envisioned a better alternative (Orwell and the Declaration of Independence). Taken together, the actions of the volunteers caused the Ethiopians to question, criticize, and dissent from their government. A large part of this dissent took the shape of opposition to American influence in the country. It is highly ironic that the actions of the volunteers, albeit indirectly, resulted in further inflaming anti-American sentiment by urging their students to stand up to the American-backed Ethiopian government.

The political nature of the Peace Corps programs in Ethiopia had a definite negative effect on the program: through anti-American sentiment. As protests grew, and more and more Ethiopians became inflamed against America, attendance in classes held by volunteers plummeted to twenty-five percent in some areas. Mobs would form to attack volunteers, with the fierce and occasionally violent sentiment against Americans the main reason for the dwindling size of the Ethiopian program. Interestingly enough, even those students that did graduate secondary school, barely twenty percent, entered an economy that did not have enough jobs for even those educated few.

 Honduras demonstrates a successful Peace Corps program, in which the operations were apolitical and yielded far different results than in Ethiopia.  When Reagan came to power in 1981, he was determined to reassert American authority over Central America which had waned after a revolt in Nicaragua overthrew a military dictatorship aligned with the United States. The rapid expansion of Peace Corps programs in Honduras during the 1980s was a result of this new focus in American foreign policy, as Reagan sought to expand influence over a neighboring country to Nicaragua. Most of the actual projects that volunteers completed had little to do with any Reaganite agenda – consisting of “agricultural production, tree planting, freshwater fisheries development, soil conservation” and other projects. While military staging for contra soldiers to fight in the ongoing Nicaraguan civil war disrupted some projects, many were left unaffected. The projects in Honduras would grow to be extremely successful, with the country continuing to house “one of the largest Peace Corps programs in the world long after… the Reagan administration came to an end”.

The apolitical nature of programs in Honduras, while not ensuring their success, contributed to it, as a necessary condition. First off, a distinction must be made between the escalation of the Honduras program and the actual day to day operations of volunteers in the country. While the escalation was clearly political and part of the Reagan agenda, the actual operations of volunteers in Honduras were apolitical. Projects that had the volunteers planting trees and building fisheries had ecological and economic effects, rather than political ones. The apolitical nature of these projects helped prevent the buildup of anti-American sentiment and ensured that the projects addressed real needs in the community. Indeed, the one project that was political in nature, Plan Alfa – an attempt to replicate in Honduras the successful literacy program carried out by rebels in Nicaragua – was a total failure. Farmers in the area did not have time to devote to literacy classes, busy with their livelihoods, and the program quickly fell apart.

Comparing and contrasting the programs in Ethiopia and Honduras, then, reveals a number of things about what makes a successful Peace Corps program. The first is that the program must be apolitical, with a distinction made between the drive behind the program and the actual activities of the program. In Honduras, the drive behind the program was very political, an attempt by Reagan to shore up American influence in Central America. Aside from Plan Alfa however, the actual day to day functions of the program were apolitical, contributing to the great success that the Honduras program was. In Ethiopia, day to day activity had a strongly political effect in creating a mentality that would contribute to strikes and protest against Selassie and America.

On a side note, it is clear as well that Volunteers need to be engaged in activities that address specific needs within the community. By engaging in developmental activities in Honduras, volunteers were able to make a real difference in the lives of locals. In contrast, the program in Ethiopia focused almost exclusively on education. Although this focus on education was not due to politics, it was a clear misallocation of resources, as the focus proved useless. Even those students who graduated were unable to utilize their education. Far more effective would have been projects that focused on developing the Ethiopian economy. The failures in Ethiopia do not seem to be overtly linked to poltical meddling, it is clear that politics could have an influence on the types of programs commisioned. This is something that must be watched for.

Of course, these observations are based off of only two case studies. Further research and investigation into other Peace Corps programs would have to be done into order to fully confirm what Ethiopia and Honduras suggest. At the same time, what Ethiopia and Honduras suggest are not that controversial. It makes sense that the less a program embroils itself in domestic politics, the more successful it will be. The purpose of the Corps is neither to foment revolution nor to maintain the political status quo; either action engenders distrust and hatred from some quarter and makes volunteer programs all the more difficult. As Honduras shows, the Peace Corps is capable of making a positive difference in communities all across the world. If the Corps cultivates and maintains an apolitical stance, than Americans can continue to improve lives and communities throughout the globe.

Works Cited

Meiser, Stanley. "The Rich Lady in Her First Job for Pay." When the World Calls: The Inside Story of the Peace Corps and Its First Fifty Years. Boston: Beacon, 2011. 148-59. Print.

Meisler, Stanley. When the World Calls: The Inside Story of the Peace Corps and Its First Fifty Years. Boston: Beacon, 2011. Print.

Meisler, Stanley. "The Fall of the Lion of Judah." When the World Calls: The Inside Story of the Peace Corps and Its First Fifty Years. Boston: Beacon, 2011. 117-28. Print.