Saturday, October 8, 2011

Women's Right to Vote in Saudi Arabia


Jas Elmer
Professor Craig
SIS 105-001H
September 11, 2011
Saudi Arabian Women Suffrage: A Step towards Women’s Rights or International Recognition?
In a country where women are viewed as inferior citizens it was officially decided that they will now have the right to vote. King Abdullah announced that Saudi women will have the right to join the consultative Shura Council as full members. They will be able to participate in future municipal elections (the only public polls in Saudi Arabia), run as candidates in the elections and vote (Al Jazeera). However, the right to vote is in part a bitter sweet victory. This is because although it gives the illusion of improved women’s rights in Saudi Arabia this event is most likely an attempt to please international powers. Furthermore, it will not actually improve the status of Saudi Arabian women, at least not in the short term.
Immediate improvement of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia is impossible because these women are denied many rights due to societal norms and a strict interpretation of Sharia law. Driving and the ability to leave the country or their houses without male guardians are just a few of the many rights which are denied to women (BBC News). Without being able to drive, many women will not be able to make it to the polls. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has strict guardianship laws and women are required to be accompanied by a male guardian at all times. Under this law women must obtain permission from their guardian (usually a husband, father, brother or uncle) to “work, travel, study, marry, or even access certain types of healthcare” (BBC News). Due to the lack of support this law has received from many males, it is likely that many women will not be able to vote because their guardian does not want to take them or does not approve of them voting. With these extreme laws and the fact that they lack a voice in society, women in Saudi Arabia will not gain rights quickly. Furthermore, these laws were not primarily set in place to benefit women but to improve Saudi Arabia’s international image.  
The first indicator that this measure was not actually put into place to benefit women is that although Saudi Arabian women now have the right to vote they will not be able to until 2015. Due to the late announcement women were not able to participate in the recent municipal poll which took place on Thursday September 26. The next poll will be held in four years (Al Jazeera). The postponed effect of this new law has outraged activists and intellectuals who attribute the postponing of this law not to the time constraints but to the King’s unwillingness to mandate change too quickly. However, if the country did not want women to vote, why would they pass this law?
Passing this law could be Saudi Arabia trying to improve their international status. Because so many world powers have granted voting rights to women, it is possible that Saudi Arabia decided that by allowing women to vote they would gain more influence on an international scale. Also with the current “Arab Spring” many outside nations have been encouraging countries in the Middle East to establish democracies, improve humanitarian efforts and grant equal rights to their citizens. In doing so the international community has also been encouraging women suffrage, this is because it can be argued that if women across the region were allowed to vote states would act in a more peaceful matter. According to polls, “women are about ten percentage points lower than men on average for their support of military actions” (Goldstein). Also due to the differences between how men and women think and act, “an international system based on feminine principles might give greater importance to the interdependence of states than to their autonomy” (Goldstein). This would encourage people, “to care for each other with less regards for states or borders” (Goldstein). Furthermore, if women had more power within national and international relations, “human rights would receive priority” (Goldstein). Therefore the international community is becoming increasingly adamant about women’s rights. Granting women the right to vote in Saudi Arabia was an important decision in order to demonstrate their dedication to international cooperation. However, the benefits associated with women suffrage and involvement in international affairs will not have a positive influence upon the women of Saudi Arabia.
 On the contrary this law could work against women. Many people in the Middle East have anti-American sentiment and do not improve of the expansion of Western ideology. Because so many people are against this law it is possible that people will view it as Western society forcing their views upon the Middle East and will be less susceptible to accepting this law. Furthermore, the reason why women previously haven’t been allowed to vote is there are strong societal norms put in place to hold back women. Without removing these other laws subjugating women, including the driving laws and guardianship laws, they will not be able to vote and will not be able to have an impact upon their communities, their country or the international scene. Also they will not become closer to being recognized as equals because the extreme gender roles and sexism in this country are still present. 
The effectiveness of this new law is still yet to be seen. Whether or not Saudi Arabian women will be given the opportunity to vote by their guardians is still uncertain. It is also uncertain whether or not other measures of women’s rights will follow in Saudi Arabia or in other countries. Also if women do have more political influence it may or may not change our current political system and help achieve peace in the Middle East. However, the strength of the subjugating societal norms currently in place in Saudi Arabia will prevent this law from providing immediate change for the women of Saudi Arabia. That being said, having a state where women are able to vote and run for elections but are not able to drive or travel on their own will provide an odd atmosphere which will become more suited to accommodating further improvements (USA Today). Hopefully this atmosphere will accelerate the progress of women’s not only in Saudi Arabia but throughout the Middle East and these women can become equals who play a crucial role in their own communities and in the world.





Works Cited
Goldstein, Joshua, and Jon Pevehouse. International Relations Tenth Edition. Boston: Longman,
2012. Print.
"Saudi Arabian woman challenges male guardianship laws." bbc.co.uk. BBC News, 29 June.
2011. Web. 25 Sept. 2011.
"Saudi king: Women can vote in 2015 local elections.” usatoday.com. USA Today, 25 Sept.
2011. Web. 25 Sept. 2011.
"Saudi women given voting rights.” english.aljazeera.net. Al Jazeera, 25 Sept. 2011. Web. 25
Sept. 2011.
"The Saudi women taking small steps for change.” bbc.co.uk. BBC News, 28 Mar. 2011. Web.
25 Sept. 2011.
"Women in Saudi Arabia to vote and run in elections." bbc.co.uk. BBC News, 25 Sept. 2011.
Web. 25 Sept. 2011.

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Irrational Iran: The Quest for Nukes

In high school I was quite notorious for the ‘No Nukes for Iran’ bumper sticker affixed to the rear of my Volkswagen. This undersized magnetic circular statement was stolen not once, but four times. Strolling through the halls of my school, I always wondered which unlikely students were the culprits of this crime and why they would steal such a miniscule magnet. I came up with two reasons: the crooks either love my bumper sticker so much they want one of their own or they love the idea of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The latter is more probable and much more worrisome.

There are two arguments relating to the (ir)rationality of Iran attempting to become nuclear. One side views Iran’s actions as irrational in the realm of the global perspective and international relations while the other believes that, domestically, Iran is essentially acting quite rational in terms of Iran’s status in the Middle East region. Despite whatever connections with identity may exist for Iran, their pursuit of nuclear weapons is detrimental to Iran’s standing in the world, making the chase for the bomb seem quite irrational.

But first, what are the dimensions of irrationality in terms of politics? According to the International Society of Political Psychology, there are four facets to irrationality: 1) incompatibility with policy goals, existing consensus, or preferred outcomes,

2) incomprehensive search and evaluation, 3) inconsistency of statements and actions, and 4) nondispassionate style (Political Psychology). Classifying Iran’s actions as irrational means that they are deviations from rational norms, not that they lack significant forethought and planning.

Iran claims its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. If Iran’s aim was to acquire a bomb for the sole quest for peace, the country would not have enriched its low-enriched uranium into weapons-grade fuel uranium. Iran's defiance of Security Council resolutions ordering it to suspend all enrichment of uranium has resulted in UN Security Council sanctions on Tehran. In 2006, the UN passed a resolution banning trade with Iran in materials and technology, which could contribute to its enrichment of uranium, the material for a possible nuclear weapon.

This insubordination on Iran’s part is an example of irrational actions – why would a country purposefully disobey the international organization in charge of international law and security? It seems much more beneficial for Iran to play along with the United Nations, in attempts to appear cooperative.

As the leading state sponsor of terrorism, a nuclear-armed Iran would pose unacceptable threats to global security. Iran would be confident in further intensifying its support for its terrorist allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, all of which are actively working to undermine U.S. interests and peace efforts (Council on Foreign Relations). Perhaps one of Iran’s goals is to strengthen their allies, but doing so further isolates them from international acceptance and moreover links them to the label of a rogue nation. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons also would likely touch off a nuclear arms race, constituting a potent threat to regional stability in the Middle East. A world in which nuclear weapons have spread widely would be a much more dangerous place and exponentially increase the likelihood that such weapons might actually be used. Without knowing Iran’s intentions, this could either help or hinder Iran. If other nations acquired nuclear weapons, Iran’s power would severely decrease, generating the idea that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb is in fact irrational. However, a Middle East amassed with nuclear weapons would pose an even greater threat to the United States and other countries against Iran’s acquirement.

A nuclear-armed Iran would likely exacerbate regional tensions. Israel, a mere 1,000 miles away from Iran, may find it hard to live with a nuclear armed Iran whose leader claims that “Israel must be wiped off the map” (Ahmadinejad). In this case, acquiring a bomb is of great benefit to Iran. If Israel ever does take military action against Iran, the Jewish state would be regarded as confrontational, not Iran. The future of peace in the Middle East is dismal so long as Iran remains a menacing actor on the world stage with nuclear weapons as its prop.

Ever since the Iranian revolution turned into an Islamic Republic, the country has become increasingly disenchanted with Iran's international isolation (Council on Foreign Relations). With this in mind, the case may be that perhaps Iran is simply not concerned with cooperating with the United States and other nations. Perhaps gaining strength from nuclear weapons is how they believe they will become a great power within the Middle East. With nuclear weapons held above other countries’ heads, like Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, Iran could gain a following and immense influence.

The National Intelligence Estimate says, “Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political economic and military costs" (NIE). This suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.

President Ahmadinejad’s signature look – a grey suit and white button-down shirt sans tie – is one of the few rational qualities of Iran. But deeming Iran’s actions as rational or irrational really depends on what you believe Ahmadinejad’s intentions to be: does he want Iran to be a key player in the United Nations globally or would he rather Iran to be the eminent leader of the Middle East region?

Whatever the case, no matter the benefits for Iran, there is nothing good that can come of their acquisition of a nuclear bomb for the rest of us. As for Iran with a bomb, their status through the global viewpoint will be regarded as hostile because they have gone against the wishes of international organizations. However, Iran could also gain prominence in the Middle East region for this acquisition of weaponry. Through discussing the various consequences of Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb, it seems that this action is irrational because Iran would be deemed as aggressive, sponsoring international rivalry rather than promoting international cooperation.

Works Cited

Council on Foreign Relations: Iran, http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362#p2

New York Times: Iran's President Says Israel Must Be 'Wiped Off the Map'

Political Psychology: The Desirability of Irrationality in Foreign Policy Making, p. 644-647

National Intelligence Estimate: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Institutions Matter!(?)

In October 2002, President George W. Bush announced the openings of military attacks on Afghanistan. Two years later, Bush again addressed the American public pronouncing a new surge, this one in Iraq. In both speeches, the president referenced threats of terrorism and instability. When speaking of Afghanistan, Bush wanted to “disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base” and “attack the military capability of the Taliban” (Full Text: Bush’s Address on the Start of War 1). In Iraq, he spoke of “an enemy that has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality” and “restoring control to the country by its own people” (Full Text: President Bush’s Address 1). Both insurgencies were spun by the same man as essential to the war on terror that had dominated foreign policy since extremist attacks on US soil on September 11th, 2001.

In announcing the war in Afghanistan, though, President Bush was able to reference one key element that he could not incorporate into his declaration of military efforts in Iraq: “the collective will of the world.” While the US went into Afghanistan with strong international backing, it entered Iraq as a rogue state, accompanied by a few quickly gathered supporters. Bush’s strategies and the elements of those strategies in beginning military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan speak to the importance of international institutions.

The United States sought and gained international cooperation concerning its decision to invade Afghanistan. President Bush placed his arguments for military action in front of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council, and both bodies agreed that the US was entitled to take action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Then Secretary General Kofi Anan maintained that military action in Afghanistan was justified as part of the UN determination to combat threats to international peace (“UN and the War in Afghanistan” 1). The United States’ willingness to transfer the decision to go to war to an international organization acting showed a commitment to liberal institutionalism.

By contrast, President Bush was not able to gather the will of the international community when trying to convince the United Nations of his surge in Iraq. Bush was unsuccessful in beginning hostilities in Iraq because he failed to (1) gain United Nations Security Council approval of the surge, (2) prove that striking in Iraq would be in self defense, or (3) prove that Iraq or Saddam Hussein committed a humanitarian offense (Hay 1). President Bush also tried to convince the Security Council that the invasion was justified based on the idea that Iraq was holding chemical and biological weapons, but a UN coalition investigated and found no such weapons existed Still, Bush decided to launch a war in Iraq, relying on what he justified as his responsibility to his own country.

Bush’s approach of seeking international support for both of his surges first and foremost, regardless of the outcome of his efforts, exemplifies how fundamental international institutions are. Bush worked to convince the United Nations that both of his wars were necessary for the good of the international community as a whole. Even when this international support was refused for the insurgency in Iraq, some type of institutionalism was so important to Bush that he formed his own quasi-UN—a coalition of the willing, including about 40 countries, the vast majority of which did not intend to contribute actual force to the efforts.

Bush’s continuance of his plan to invade Iraq after the international community did not give its blessing cost him in reputation at home and abroad, especially in the enduring aftermath after the initial invasion. While public opinion of the president increased immediately after the Iraq surge, Bush’s approval rating never reached 50% from late 2003 to early 2005, as the fighting dragged on. When voters were asked what President Bush would be remembered for as he left office in 2008, 51% said his legacy of war, 29% of these people specifically referencing Iraq (“Bush and Public Opinion” 2). Globally, opinions of the United States had been declining since the beginning of the century but further declines were found after the Iraq invasion in 2003. Mounting discontent over U.S. foreign policy translated into a concern over American power, as shown by deteriorating approval numbers (“Bush and Public Opinion” 3).

Bush’s approval ratings averaged close to 70% as the Afghanistan surge began. These numbers did decline as well, but the U.S. nonetheless continued to gain international support and momentum for its mission. The United Nations maintained a humanitarian mission in Afghanistan shortly after the surge began. By 2006, the US formed a coalition of fifty NATO member states and more than fifteen non-NATO members as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The role of the ISAF was to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security, reconstructing the country, training the national police and army, and providing a lawful environment for elections (“NATO in Afghanistan” 1). By the time the NATO force was established, Bush’s ratings were increasing, although they were lower than before the onset of war. As time went on, the efforts in Afghanistan were still established and seen as collective, and Bush’s individual image suffered less as a result.

So, George W. Bush’s strategies in establishing war in Iraq and Afghanistan reveal the significance of international institutions. We see that Bush tried vehemently to gain international cooperation for his stances, and even when he did not receive the backing he was looking for, he still craved some type of support enough to gather countries that would commit the lowest of allegiances to his ideas. Moreover, the decision to go into Iraq unsupported by the international community as a whole cost Bush major percentage points in global and domestic opinion polls, with no one else to share the brunt of the criticism.

Institutions gain even more validation when we consider the initial decision to reject Bush’s proposal of war with Iraq. The UN referenced specific guidelines that Bush had to follow in order to convince the Security Council of his plan, and when he failed to meet those criteria, the UN was not hesitant to reject his plan of action. If, as realism asserts, institutions are merely puppets of the great powers, this decision making process would not be nearly as involved; Bush would have had no trouble gaining the authorization he sought.
As evidenced by how hard George W. Bush tried to gain institutional support for both of his wars, and how much he lost after he charged ahead without this institutional support in Iraq, we can see that institutionalism is more than just a stamp of approval. International institutions have their own standards and procedures; they are able to think for themselves. These institutions influence leader’s strategies, and the decisions they make affect leaders’ images at home and throughout the world. Bush’s tactical energy and acquired damages have exemplified that international institutions do matter.


Works Cited

"Bush and Public Opinion." Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 18 Dec.

2008. Web. 03 Oct. 2011.

opinion/>.

"Full Text: President Bush's Address | World News | Guardian.co.uk." Latest News, Sport

and Comment from the Guardian | The Guardian. 7 Oct. 2001. Web. 03 Oct.

2011. .

"Full Text: George Bush's Address on the Start of War | World News | Guardian.co.uk."

Latest News, Sport and Comment from the Guardian | The Guardian. 19 Mar. 2003. Web. 03 Oct. 2011. .

Hay, Chelsey E. "President Bush, The Iraq Invasion, and "Enhanced Interrogation" –

Student Pulse." Academic Articles. Online Academic Journal. Student Pulse

Academic Journal, 16 June 2010. Web. 03 Oct. 2011.

enhanced-interrogation>.

"NATO in Afghanistan: Security and Development | United States Mission to NATO."

Home | United States Mission to NATO. Web. 03 Oct. 2011.

.

"UN and the War in Afghanistan." The Humanist Society of NZ - Home Page. 7 Oct.

2006. Web. 03 Oct. 2011

html>.

Sunday, October 2, 2011

Laissez-Faire

Jonathan Beatty

Professor Craig

World Politics 001H

Submission Date: 2 October 2011

Laissez-Faire Economic Policy

Laissez-Faire is defined by Merriam-Webster as “a doctrine opposing governmental interference in economic affairs beyond the minimum necessary for the maintenance of peace and property rights.” (Meririam Webster) Developed around Adam Smith’s idea of the “invisible hand,” a laissez-faire economic policy is based around minimal governmental interaction (Business Dictionary). Many examples of near-laissez-faire policy exist throughout history. When the British were the Hegemon in the world system, they had adopted a near-laissez-faire-policy of free trade. The deregulation of the trading system and of the economic system allowed the British to establish and increase their influence over the world. In addition, France had a system situated around laissez-faire. The United States also had this system during the Antebellum period. (Case for Laissez-Faire)

The clearest example of a successful economy based on a Laissez-Faire policy is Great Britain during the period it served as a Hegemon. Laissez-Faire policy allowed the British to remove trade restrictions and to deregulate international trade. This allowed the British to expand their Commonwealth. The book The Wealth of Nations, written by Adam Smith, contained forward thinking advice, such as giving more money to the capitalists to invest (Wealth of Nations). Mr. Smith’s guidance allowed Great Britain to become the world’s leading economic power. The decreased regulation by the government allowed the British East India Trading Company to flourish and increase British Power (Mercantilism). The poor treatment of newly-conquered people by the British government brought the Hegemon to its demise. The use of a laissez-faire economic policy was a sustaining factor in British Hegemony.

Throughout its history, France has exhibited laissez-faire economic policies several times. France was one of the initial countries to use a laissez-faire economic policy. It is suggested that laissez-faire was initially suggested by Jean-Baptiste Colbert. When asking industry titans in France during the period of Louis XIV what could be done to improve industry, the industrialists replied simply “Leave us alone.” (Britannica, Laissez-Faire) Decreased regulation was practiced during the reign of Louis XIV, allowing him to grow his empire into one that extended the boundaries of France. France did find itself losing power exponentially towards the end of his reign. This loss was not due to French economic policies. This loss was due to misinformed social decisions and the involvement in many wars (Britannica, Louis XIV). The French revisited laissez-faire heavily during the Fourth Plan, where the market was based around laissez-faire policy and the government was centralized. Because of the success of this plan, the laissez-faire policy was furthered into the Fifth Plan.

The United States has also exhibited laissez-faire economic policies in the past. The clearest example was during the Antebellum Period. As Kevin Dowd wrote in A Case for Financial Laissez-Faire, banks in the United States had “virtually no federal regulations and yet had capital ratios in most years of over 40%.” The only reason the laissez-faire was not continued in the United States was because of the start of the Civil War. The destabilization of most institutions was a direct consequence of the Civil War. After the Civil War, most institutions were in need of financial support (Case for Laissez-Faire). The government decided to intervene. Consequently, the United States’ economic section has heavily relied on its government to be its backbone. As a result economic growth has been sporadic and financial crises have developed.

The results of laissez-faire economic policies are why laissez-faire policies are implemented. Laissez-faire policies result in uninhibited economic growth. This results in improved infrastructure and a self-reliant economic system. Laissez-faires are unpopular, especially after financial crises. The reason for it being unpopular is because the lack of help from government results in the recovery taking a longer period of time. Its unpopularity arises because of the extraordinarily length of time that recovery takes when under a laissez-faire policy. This is because the economy has to recover on its own; no stimulus package is put into place by the government. Presently, the stock levels in the last week have been decent, but it was recently reported that this quarter has been the worst quarter since 2008 (Stock Market). Economists are suggesting that we are starting to experience what is referred to as a “Double-Dip Recession” (Double Dip Recession). If history is any indication, the second recession in a Double-Dip Recession will be worse than and longer than the first recession. Part of the current economic crisis can be blamed on the instability of other world markets. Ultimately, some of the blame resides in Washington D.C. and its decision to forego a laissez-faire policy (Applet).

There are defects with a laissez-faire policy. The main defect is the potential for corruption if it is not managed correctly. The absence of regulation is a determining factor. In a laissez-faire system, economic powers have to regulate each other with minimal intervention from the government. This is difficult. But if a laissez-faire system is successful, economic benefits far outweigh these defects.

A decision to switch to a more laissez-faire-influenced economic policy is an unpopular decision. But, this policy would result in uninhibited economic growth. The United States is in desperate need of economic growth, especially with the threat of another recession. The decision to use a stimulus package was a bold decision made in Washington. Even though it was more effective than originally thought, the effects are already starting to wane. Initially, the policy of getting banks back on their feet met its intended result. Unfortunately, as the months passed, more money was handed out. Eventually the economic system of the United States became more intertwined with the government. In hindsight, if the United States had adopted a policy of laissez-faire during the recession, the recession would have lasted longer. Likewise, the United States’ economy would currently be stronger and not facing the threat of another recession.

Works Cited

Applet-magic.com. "The Economic History and the Economy of France." Index Page for Applet-magic.com. Applet Magic. Web. 01 Oct. 2011. .

Britannica. "Laissez-Faire (Economics) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Britannica Academic Edition, 2011. Web. 01 Oct. 2011. .

Britannica. "Louis XIV (King of France) - Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Britannica Academic Edition, 2011. Web. 01 Oct. 2011. .

BusinessDictionary.com. "What Is Laissez-faire Economics?" BusinessDictionary.com - Online Business Dictionary. WebFinance, Inc. Web. 29 Sept. 2011. .

Dowd, Kevin. "The Case for Financial Laissez-Faire." The Economic Journal 106.436 (1986): 679-87. JSTOR. Blackwell Publishing for the Royal Economic Society, 9 Aug. 2009. Web. 29 Sept. 2011. .

Merriam Webster. "Laissez-faire - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary." Dictionary and Thesaurus - Merriam-Webster Online. Merriam Webster. Web. 02 Oct. 2011. .

Norris, Floyd. "Time to Say It: Double Dip Recession May Be Happening." Editorial. The New York Times 5 Aug. 2011. Nytimes.com. The New York Times, 4 Aug. 2011. Web. 1 Oct. 2011. .

Scarlett. "Adam Smith The Wealth Of Nations Summary." Scarlett: History of Economic Theory and Thought. Scarlett, 2011. Web. 02 Oct. 2011. .

Smith, Adam. "Mercantilism: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics." Library of Economics and Liberty. Library of Economics and Liberty, 2008. Web. 01 Oct. 2011. .

Wagner, Daniel, and David K. Randall. "Stock Market: Worst Quarter Since 2008 - CSMonitor.com." The Christian Science Monitor - CSMonitor.com. The Christian Science Monitor, 30 Sept. 2011. Web. 01 Oct. 2011. .

Is liberalism good for Russia?

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, seen by the U.S. as a potential reformer, has recently asked Prime Minister Vladmir Putin to run for president again (Englund). Putin is widely considered the most powerful man in Russia despite his current rank, which is subordinate to the president. Scholars and the media seem to concur that Medvedev is nothing more than Putin’s puppet, and they are often referred to as a pair, almost interchangeable. This March, Russia’s largest party, which Putin heads, was once again accused of fixing the elections as they have consistently been accused for the past decade (“Ruling Party”). This August, I read an editorial by Kathy Lally and Will Englund about how democracy in Russia has failed, and indeed it looks as though the trends support this. Putin has essentially run the country for over a decade, and his party seems inescapably corrupt. The United States, as a liberal nation, feels a responsibility to promote liberal ideals in other nations, so if Putin comes back in power we may see a stronger push for liberalism in Russia. However, if we examine the case of Russia, we can see that liberalism may not be the best solution for every country.

Despite his grip on the presidency, Putin’s watchword is stability (Ioffe), and for now, Russia remains internally stable. Russians are relatively content, able to talk freely (albeit privately) about the government, and do not seem very interested in either participating in politics or rebelling (Laquer). Support for United Russia, Putin’s party, remains high (Lally). Lally and Englund also point out that, “Instead of blaming the legacy of the unsustainable Soviet economy for their suffering, Russians blamed the reformers. Democracy began to acquire a dubious reputation”. By the late 1990s, Russian democracy had been corrupted into an oligarchy (Lacquer). Russia tried to create liberalism without security, but ended up with security rather than liberalism. Moreover, as Walter Lacquer argues in his essay, “Moscow’s Modernization Dilemma,” that, “As they [Russians] see it, Russia's traditions are not those of the West, and in the country's present labile state, more democracy would be harmful, possibly fatal.” It seems Russians do indeed “prefer stability to democracy” (Lacquer).

The idea that security is better than freedom is a concept that Americans, as members of an extremely liberal state, may have trouble grasping. If we subscribe to the liberal world order, what is our responsibility in cases like Russia? Partly free states like Russia pose a conundrum for the spread of the liberal world order. Should the United States pressure Russia to stop corruption and upset stability, causing conflict that may leak into the international realm? Or should the United States allow a powerful state to exist with a façade of democracy, a moral problem for liberals? The United States has supported autocracies before, but always with the argument of fending off a greater political evil – support of dictators in Latin America during the Cold War, for example. In contrast, the current conflict in the Middle East is an indicator of what happens when the United States tries to implant democracy where democracy doesn’t already have a foothold.

Interestingly, Russia’s system seems to be working. Within Russia, Medvedev is considered a reformer, even if he is tied to the conservative Putin. After all, in 2009 he frankly told United Russia it must stop fixing elections, clearly an attempt to bring democracy back to Russia’s political system (“Backwardness”). In May 2010, Russian Newsweek leaked a new foreign policy outline pushing for a better relationship with Western Europe (Mankoff). While scholars generally acknowledge Putin as “the power behind the throne” during Medvedev’s presidency, Medvedev is generally seen as a reformer, more eager to bring Russia into the global community than his predecessor. His goal is to improve Russia’s struggling economy – a goal Putin shares (Shleifer) - and modernize through closer ties with the West (Mankoff).

One possibility is that the combination of Medvedev and Putin will create a stable country working toward modernization. Russians’ qualms about reform may be tempered by Putin’s conservatism, while Putin’s reluctance to work with the West may be undermined by the relationship built between Medvedev and Obama. The West could be reassured of Russia’s good intentions through Russia’s willingness to work with the West even if Russia doesn’t subscribe to democracy. Internal stability and working within the international system may be better than a lack of corruption.

So is Russian autocracy necessarily a bad thing? Liberalism does argue that democracy is the key to peace. Russia inarguably still has economic problems and massive amounts of corruption. However, Russia and the United States’ relations have been improving despite Russia’s questionable democracy. Laqueur suggests that “perhaps the West should not even press for [democratization], given that the majority of the Russian leadership and the Russian people seem not to favor it.” The “tandemocracy” of Putin and Medvedev may be the best solution for Russia and the world right now.

In a broader context, should we force liberalism on nations that don’t want it? To do so seems counterintuitive to liberalism’s claim to create peace. The peaceful liberal world can only exist when all nations are liberal, but given the United States’ recent track record in bringing democracy to the Middle East, liberal republicanism does not seem very effective. Liberal revolutions from within the nation when the people are ready – such as the Arab Spring or the United States’ own revolution – may be the only true way for liberalism to spread. True liberalism encourages peace, but peaceful liberalism can only come into a nation with the right mindset.

Works Cited

Barry, Ellen. “Medvedev Says ‘Backwardness’ Undermines Party.” New York Times 21 Nov. 2009. Web. 27 Sept. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/world/europe/22russia.html >

---. “Ruling Party is Accused of Fraud in Russian Vote.” New York Times 13 March 2011. Web. 27 Sept. 2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/world/europe/14russia.html>

Englund Will and Kathy Lally. “Medvedev confirms he will step aside for Putin to return to Russia’s presidency.” Washington Post 24 Sept. 2011. Web. 24 Sept. 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/dmitry-medvedev-asks-putin-to-run-for-president-of-russia/2011/09/24/gIQAXGwpsK_story.html >

Ioffe, Julia. “The Return of the King.” Foreign Policy 24 Sept 2011. Web. 29 Sept. 2011. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/24/the_return_of_the_king?page=0,0>

Lally, Kathy and Will Englund. “Russia, once almost a democracy.” Washington Post 18 Aug. 2011. Web. 24 Sept. 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-once-almost-a-democracy/2011/08/12/gIQAMriNOJ_story.html >

Laqueur, Walter. “Moscow’s Modernization Dilemma: Is Russia Charting a New Foreign Policy?” Foreign Affairs November/December 2010. Web. 27 Sept. 2011. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66860/walter-laqueur/moscows-modernization-dilemma?page=show>

Mankoff, Jeffrey. “Changing Course in Moscow.” Foreign Affairs 7 Sept 2010. Web. 25 Sept. 2011. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66743/jeffrey-mankoff/changing-course-in-moscow>

Shleifer, Andrei and Daniel Treisman. “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, not Psychology.” Foreign Affairs January/February 2011. Web. 25 Sept. 2011. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67044/andrei-shleifer-and-daniel-treisman/why-moscow-says-no>

To endorse or not to endorse, that is the question.

Last week Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and president of the West Bank, spoke before the UN general assembly after he submitted a bid for U.N. recognition of the Palestinian state. There has been much debate over the merits of this bold political move because it goes against the norms of direct negotiation that have dictated the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Through the lens of liberalism one can both establish support and opposition for the Palestinian’s statehood bid. It is interesting that one international relations theory can be used to back both sides of an argument. This contradiction displays the different uses for the theory of liberalism as well as the weakness of its inconsistency.


First let us address how liberalism can be used to endorse the Palestinian bid for statehood. The theory of liberalism supports the idea that the public will never choose war. Abbas asserted the presence of democracy in the future of the Palestinian people during his U.N. speech, “we have been strengthening what we seeking to be the features of our State:...the pillars of democracy as the basis for the Palestinian political life.” According the theory of liberalism this democratic development in Palestine would be beneficial not only for the Palestinians themselves, but for the region as a whole. Using this argument it is counterproductive for the Israelis to argue against the bid for statehood because a democratic Palestine would never choose war. The people would see the costs as too great and pursue paths of peace instead. Husam Zomlot, a senior official in Fatah’s Department of Foreign Relations and representative of the PLO at the 66th U.N. General Assembly, supplemented Abbas’ claim by asserting the peacefulness that would follow the creation of a Palestinian state, “legally, a Palestinian state is a deterrent weapon. We are not going to engage in attacks like Israel does. Our deterrent is international law” (Horesh).


Zomlot’s statement also connects to the second liberalist argument in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state: liberal institutionalism and an increase in reciprocity. Liberalism encompasses the idea that countries are less likely to turn to war if they have incentives not to, like collective security concerns, which come from inclusion in institutions like the U.N. There is also the notion that countries exposed to reciprocity will be less likely to choose war because it discourages the idea of zero sum international policy and encourages mutually beneficial options. In accordance with this idea Israel, and the international community, should support the admission of Palestine into the U.N. General Assembly because this would expose the Palestinians to reciprocity. Supposedly this would also forge bonds between Israel and Palestine because they would have collective concerns because they belong to the same organization.


This idea of endorsing the Palestinian bid for statehood based on the ideas of liberalism has even been utilized by American political figures. One such instance is the op-ed piece written by Keith Ellison, a democratic representative from Minnesota, “the Palestinian Authority, unlike Hamas, is pursuing statehood nonviolently and diplomatically now, so why are we discouraging its efforts?” Such claims and questions have merit, but they are challenged by another idea stemming from the theory of liberalism: the threat of radicals.


Liberalism asserts the peacefulness of democracy, but there is a flaw in this idea; if radicals take power it breaks the connection between the people and the government. The radicals do not listen to the will of the people, so it stops mattering weather the people choose violence or not. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed this potential issue in his speech in front of the U.N. General Assembly shortly after Abbas’ speech. Netanyahu spoke of how Israel made concessions, like the one he is being asked to do with the West Bank, in Lebanon and mainly Gaza. Netanyahu spoke of how radicals, not moderates, took over when Israel withdrew:

“Now the theory says it should all work out, and President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority now could build a peaceful state in Gaza. You can remember that the entire world applauded. They applauded our withdrawal as an act of great statesmanship. It was a bold act of peace. But ladies and gentlemen, we didn't get peace. We got war. We got Iran, which through its proxy Hamas promptly kicked out the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority collapsed in a day -- in one day.”

Netanyahu went on to suggest that radicals could also take control of the West Bank if the UN recognized it as a state before security negations had been completed when he discussed the channels through which radical influence and militarism leaks into the area, “President Abbas just said on this podium that the Palestinians are armed only with their hopes and dreams. Yeah, hopes, dreams and 10,000 missiles and Grad rockets supplied by Iran, not to mention the river of lethal weapons now flowing into Gaza from the Sinai, from Libya, and from elsewhere.”


The threat of radical take over of a future Palestinian state is accented by the division between the PLO and Hamas. “In the days before Abbas' U.N. speech, Hamas banned all public shows of support for the Palestinian president. Hamas alleged the edict had the support of Fatah, ostensibly to avoid friction, although some Fatah leaders in Gaza denied they had agreed to stay off the streets. In the end, only a tiny PLO faction rallied for Abbas” (Laub). This lack of unity implies that there would be a struggle to establish control of a newly established Palestine. Hamas already won control over Gaza, what is there to suggest that Abbas, often seen as a weak leader, would gain control of the state instead? If Hamas were to control the Palestinian state, the public would not have a say in government dealings, and therefore the people’s abhorrence of war would not matter.


Liberalism can be used both to endorse and to oppose U.N. recognition of a Palestinian state. More than finding an answer, this case study seems to find weakness in the contradictory nature of the theory. Though liberalism can be used to analyze the different aspects of an issue, it gets one no closer to finding a solution. Further case studies could establish if this is a constant problem with liberalism or a rarity.


Works Cited

Ellison, Keith. "Support the Palestinian Bid for Statehood." NYTimes.com. The New York Times, 22 Sept. 2011. Web. 30 Sept. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/opinion/support-the-palestinian-bid-for-statehood.html?_r=1>.

"Full Transcript of Abbas Speech at UN General Assembly - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News." Israel News - Haaretz Israeli News Source. Haaretz, 23 Sept. 2011. Web. 30 Sept. 2011. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/full-transcript-of-abbas-speech-at-un-general-assembly-1.386385>.

"Full Transcript of Netanyahu Speech at UN General Assembly - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News." Israel News - Haaretz Israeli News Source. Haaretz, 24 Sept. 2011. Web. 30 Sept. 2011. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/full-transcript-of-netanyahu-speech-at-un-general-assembly-1.386464>.

Horesh, Roxanne. "Debating the UN Bid for Palestinian Statehood - Features - Al Jazeera English." AJE - Al Jazeera English. Al Jazeera, 19 Sept. 2011. Web. 30 Sept. 2011. <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/09/201191910126371759.html>.

Laub, Karin. "Analysis: UN Speech Gives Abbas a Stronger Hand | World News | The Guardian." Latest News, Sport and Comment from the Guardian | The Guardian. Associated Press, 27 Sept. 2011. Web. 30 Sept. 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9866804>.