In October 2002, President George W. Bush announced the openings of military attacks on Afghanistan. Two years later, Bush again addressed the American public pronouncing a new surge, this one in Iraq. In both speeches, the president referenced threats of terrorism and instability. When speaking of Afghanistan, Bush wanted to “disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base” and “attack the military capability of the Taliban” (Full Text: Bush’s Address on the Start of War 1). In Iraq, he spoke of “an enemy that has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality” and “restoring control to the country by its own people” (Full Text: President Bush’s Address 1). Both insurgencies were spun by the same man as essential to the war on terror that had dominated foreign policy since extremist attacks on US soil on September 11th, 2001.
In announcing the war in Afghanistan, though, President Bush was able to reference one key element that he could not incorporate into his declaration of military efforts in Iraq: “the collective will of the world.” While the US went into Afghanistan with strong international backing, it entered Iraq as a rogue state, accompanied by a few quickly gathered supporters. Bush’s strategies and the elements of those strategies in beginning military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan speak to the importance of international institutions.
The United States sought and gained international cooperation concerning its decision to invade Afghanistan. President Bush placed his arguments for military action in front of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council, and both bodies agreed that the US was entitled to take action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Then Secretary General Kofi Anan maintained that military action in Afghanistan was justified as part of the UN determination to combat threats to international peace (“UN and the War in Afghanistan” 1). The United States’ willingness to transfer the decision to go to war to an international organization acting showed a commitment to liberal institutionalism.
By contrast, President Bush was not able to gather the will of the international community when trying to convince the United Nations of his surge in Iraq. Bush was unsuccessful in beginning hostilities in Iraq because he failed to (1) gain United Nations Security Council approval of the surge, (2) prove that striking in Iraq would be in self defense, or (3) prove that Iraq or Saddam Hussein committed a humanitarian offense (Hay 1). President Bush also tried to convince the Security Council that the invasion was justified based on the idea that Iraq was holding chemical and biological weapons, but a UN coalition investigated and found no such weapons existed Still, Bush decided to launch a war in Iraq, relying on what he justified as his responsibility to his own country.
Bush’s approach of seeking international support for both of his surges first and foremost, regardless of the outcome of his efforts, exemplifies how fundamental international institutions are. Bush worked to convince the United Nations that both of his wars were necessary for the good of the international community as a whole. Even when this international support was refused for the insurgency in Iraq, some type of institutionalism was so important to Bush that he formed his own quasi-UN—a coalition of the willing, including about 40 countries, the vast majority of which did not intend to contribute actual force to the efforts.
Bush’s continuance of his plan to invade Iraq after the international community did not give its blessing cost him in reputation at home and abroad, especially in the enduring aftermath after the initial invasion. While public opinion of the president increased immediately after the Iraq surge, Bush’s approval rating never reached 50% from late 2003 to early 2005, as the fighting dragged on. When voters were asked what President Bush would be remembered for as he left office in 2008, 51% said his legacy of war, 29% of these people specifically referencing Iraq (“Bush and Public Opinion” 2). Globally, opinions of the United States had been declining since the beginning of the century but further declines were found after the Iraq invasion in 2003. Mounting discontent over U.S. foreign policy translated into a concern over American power, as shown by deteriorating approval numbers (“Bush and Public Opinion” 3).
Bush’s approval ratings averaged close to 70% as the Afghanistan surge began. These numbers did decline as well, but the U.S. nonetheless continued to gain international support and momentum for its mission. The United Nations maintained a humanitarian mission in Afghanistan shortly after the surge began. By 2006, the US formed a coalition of fifty NATO member states and more than fifteen non-NATO members as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The role of the ISAF was to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security, reconstructing the country, training the national police and army, and providing a lawful environment for elections (“NATO in Afghanistan” 1). By the time the NATO force was established, Bush’s ratings were increasing, although they were lower than before the onset of war. As time went on, the efforts in Afghanistan were still established and seen as collective, and Bush’s individual image suffered less as a result.
So, George W. Bush’s strategies in establishing war in Iraq and Afghanistan reveal the significance of international institutions. We see that Bush tried vehemently to gain international cooperation for his stances, and even when he did not receive the backing he was looking for, he still craved some type of support enough to gather countries that would commit the lowest of allegiances to his ideas. Moreover, the decision to go into Iraq unsupported by the international community as a whole cost Bush major percentage points in global and domestic opinion polls, with no one else to share the brunt of the criticism.
Institutions gain even more validation when we consider the initial decision to reject Bush’s proposal of war with Iraq. The UN referenced specific guidelines that Bush had to follow in order to convince the Security Council of his plan, and when he failed to meet those criteria, the UN was not hesitant to reject his plan of action. If, as realism asserts, institutions are merely puppets of the great powers, this decision making process would not be nearly as involved; Bush would have had no trouble gaining the authorization he sought.
As evidenced by how hard George W. Bush tried to gain institutional support for both of his wars, and how much he lost after he charged ahead without this institutional support in Iraq, we can see that institutionalism is more than just a stamp of approval. International institutions have their own standards and procedures; they are able to think for themselves. These institutions influence leader’s strategies, and the decisions they make affect leaders’ images at home and throughout the world. Bush’s tactical energy and acquired damages have exemplified that international institutions do matter.
Works Cited
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Hay, Chelsey E. "President Bush, The Iraq Invasion, and "Enhanced Interrogation" –
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few technology errors when posting this--hence lack of indentation on last paragraph and strange works cited formatting!
ReplyDeleteI really liked your paper in that it explored one of those things that I've known but never really stopped to think about. I think that the differences between the Afghanistan invasion and the Iraq invasion, and the reactions to each - both domestically and internationally - are quite interesting. I would agree completely with your claim that international organizations do matter; for example, as I talked about in my paper on Libya, through waiting for support from the UN before intervening, the Obama Administration was able to garner international support, which definitely served to help the image of the US. I think that seeking the aid (and approval) of an international organization like the UN is important with regards to establishing the credibility of an invasion or intervention; however, as was the case with Iraq, the international organization doesn't always give the answer for which a country hopes. Do you think that, in this instance, it would be wiser for the country in question to listen to the international organization?
ReplyDeleteI agree that international institutions such as the UN can be very important in gaining international support of the actions of a country. However, there are also instances where the support of the UN does not come quickly enough, such as in Rwanda (as mentioned in Caroline's previous paper), my paper about international aid to Somalia, and a slew of other papers on this blog. Sometimes international intervention is in the right, and sometimes it is in the wrong. In this case, in contrasting the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, I believe the actions of the UN in supporting the war in Afghanistan but not Iraq were correct and important to understanding how the conflicts have played out in each respective country.
ReplyDeleteI do like that you mentioned how Bush created his own "quasi-UN" in order to garner the support he needed for Iraq because this really drove the point home that the difference between having an international body behind you in a war or not having one can have a profound impact on the way the war plays out. A collective international attitude towards a war is one step towards fighting it successfully and confidently.
Meg: I do think that it would have been wiser for Bush to listen to the UN and not invade, because it would have overall boosted (and to an extent, saved) his image and subsequently the image of the U.S. I agree that following the lead of an international organization, and gaining its support, establishes credibility that goes a long way domestically and internationally.
ReplyDeleteThen again, one can spin Bush's worry as legitimate: he whole heartedly believed that failing to invading Iraq translated to failing to protect the American people. So, where does a leader cross the line between "going with the status quo" (the collective will) and taking action to benefit what they believe is a huge threat to the security of their own country? The issue with Bush, though, is that his claims proved to be faulty: no WMDs were found, and he ended up rearranging his foundation for war in the first place, from attacking a dangerous and immoral enemy to maintaining democracy and freedom in Iraq. Both of these elements combined into dragged out fighting and a huge drop in support, one that would have not been as severe if the effort was collective.
Steph:I completely agree with the last sentence of your post; a collective attitude is fundamental toward fighting a war successfully and confidently. But you also point out that the UN is not, by any means, perfect in establishing all the small details of its support--in particular, when things don't go "according to plan," as in Rwanda where the mission quickly turned from oversight to a need for immediate intervention (that was not granted). I think the UN was successful in the effort toward Afghanistan because its actions were pretty solidly laid out: provide support in terms of collective manpower and force. Still, the support did not all come in one huge wave, and the speed at which international institutions work, regardless of what they are supporting, is constantly put in question.
I actually think that this paper explores a unique cross-section of the interactions of both Liberalism and Realism. It seems as though nations will try to build some kind of an international coalition to achieve their goals, as Bush did in invading Afghanistan. That was a liberal approach, which ended up increasing Bush's approval rating and scored well with the international community. It was a great situation for Bush because his goals lined up with many of the other world powers. However, when Bush decided to invade Iraq, he took more of a realist approach. His goals no longer matched up with the UN's and others in the international community. Instead of focusing on coalition, he focused on power. So I agree that international approval can be very important, there is still the aspect of power to look at. Overall I really liked the paper and you did a great job in explaining the liberal perspective!
ReplyDeleteDespite the distinct reactions Bush received from the UN regarding the two different wars, he still went along and invaded both countries. In this case, I see the power of an institution as merely superficial - did the UN really have that much influence on Bush's decision to go into Iraq?
ReplyDeleteMollie: While the lack of support from the institution from the UN didn't change Bush's stance on his need to invade Iraq, the fact that he tried so hard to get that support and his image suffered so much because of a lack of it proves that institutions are not merely superficial. You are right when you say the the UN didn't make the initial yes/no decision for iraq, but its support definitely drove Bush's strategy.
ReplyDeleteAdam: It's interesting that you say that, because I started this paper trying to compare Bush's two approaches to war, the realist vs. the liberal. I definitely agree that there was still a power element involved in Bush's thinking, especially in terms of Iraq. The articles I read said that the decision to go into Iraq really represented a change in Bush's leadership: he "stiffened his spine" once he made the decision, and he even neglected the help of nations who didn't originally support his decision when those nations offered to help rebuild Iraq. Ultimately, it's clear that Bush felt a need to defend his own thinking and his own reputation--which actually ended up suffering.
ReplyDeleteThough Afghanistan may represent a success of liberal institutionalism and Iraq may represent a failure, is there really such a difference? It can be said that neither war has been successful and achieved their mission objectives. Could this constitute a failure of liberal institutionalism as a whole?
ReplyDeleteSagatom: I don't think that the opinion of failed objectives translates to a failure of liberal institutionalism. I think that the objectives of both wars have changed multiple times, so it's hard to judge what the standard of success is. Also, the UN did not necessarily support the war in Afghanistan because they thought the US would be automatically successful. The statements from the UN reveal that their decision was based on the idea that the US was justified in entering the war. The lines between success and support are blurry here.
ReplyDeleteCaroline: I agree that in a way, the idea of failed objectives and a failure of liberal institutionalism are not exactly the same. The fact that each of the wars has been changed so often leaves many confused and will leave future scholars wondering what exactly the US was trying to accomplish in the first place.
ReplyDeleteWhat bothers me the most is that even though the UN did not support the US decision to enter Iraq, there was no effort to restrain the US either. The UN recognized the US's sheer power since, as you stated "they thought the US would be automatically successful." In this case, it seems that even if the UN thinks one way or another, it does not play much of a part beyond its words. Even though this hurt Bush's opinion polls, he was still re-elected even when losing support in 2007. This may have hurt his public image and our nation's image in the world theater, but it does not restrain the power being exerted by the US. In the future if the US were to enter another war, would it really matter if it had UN approval? It has yet to stop the US from proceeding whether or not the invasion or attack is accepted by the international community.
Will: I share the sense of frustration you reference when talking about the UN's lack of action to restrain the US after they denied their support for the Iraq War effort. The inability of the UN to really enforce its decisions goes toward the idea of a world government. At the end of the day, even though the UN is a central body, it is made up of individual nations, each with its own interests, goals and strategies. Yes, potentially the UN could use reciprocity to enforce something like sanctions for a nation that goes against its will, but with a nation as powerful as the US (and the fact that US is on the Security Council) such a "punishment" would never happen. The inability to really do much besides render an opinion is one of the main controversies or faults of the UN. However, as seen with Bush's decreasing approval ratings, those words still carry heavy weight. Yes, Bush was still re-elected. but after that re-election, as the fighting dragged on, his numbers plummeted to the point where he was the president with one of the lowest approval ratings ever. So, while the UN cannot stop the US from proceeding down a certain path, it can make clear to the world which option the international community supports. That opinion, most of the time, is backed up by the public.
ReplyDelete