In Sierra Leone on March 23rd, 1991, fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war near the country’s border with Liberia. Their intent was to overthrow the government and the president, Joseph Momoh. Initial defense for the government came from the Sierra Leone army in conjunction with the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, within the next year the army instead overthrew the Sierra Leone government. The result was a chaotic civil war that lasted for eleven years (“UNAMSIL-Background”).
The end of the civil war in Sierra Leone and the resulting peace was due to the 1999 UN peacekeeping mission, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The mission cooperated with the government and other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement. It also contained within its mandate civil affairs, civilian police, administrative, and technical components. The UN successfully completed this mandate in 2005, peace was achieved in Sierra Leone, and the UN now proudly proclaims UNAMSIL to be a “success story in peacekeeping” (“UNAMSIL”).
However, what is not touched upon on the UN’s website is the activity of the African private military company, Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. In 1995-96, this PMC combated and defeated Liberian-backed RUF rebels at a cost of less than $40 million. UNAMSIL operated at a budget of upwards $50 million per month (Brooks 131). Contrasts of the quality and efficiency between PMCs and UN operations such as this have led to a proposal for new uses of PMCs: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian rescue missions. The evolution of military services provided by private firms has led PMCs to transcend government power in its cost-effectiveness and capabilities.
The reason why PMC operations tend to be much more effective than operations run by state militaries stems from the topics on mercenaries discussed in class. Take for example the pyramid of mercenaries, with first-world mercenaries in the top, mercenaries from developing countries in the middle, and local mercenaries at the bottom. A majority of PMCs utilize retired personnel from national militaries as their operatives (Brooks 130). Thus, most PMCs who can viably participate in peacekeeping are at the top of the pyramid. The private operatives have experience as troops from the best militaries of the world, and are completely capable of confronting large yet poorly-trained armed groups typical of the conflict zones in developing areas. In the case of Sierra Leone, despite requiring a $50 million per month budget, the UN was criticized for deploying only poorly trained and lightly-armed troops (Fleshman). Considering that PMCs require much smaller budgets and provide elite troops, utilizing these firms for peacekeeping does appear to be a more effective and economical option.
Professor Craig’s interstice theory supports the idea of privatized peacekeeping as well. According to Professor Craig, interstices are areas between states that are lacking sovereignty. Peacekeeping very much falls under the definition of interstices between sovereign states; often times, conflict zones are in states of anarchy or have no clear sovereign government. For example, in Sierra Leone, the RUF refused to participate in or acknowledge the 1996 election of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah . Instead, they formed a ruling junta with the Sierra Leone army (UNAMSIL-Background). The result was an area of conflict where it was unclear what governing body the UN could effectively negotiate with. As stated in class, states rely on mercenaries to master scenarios such as this. Mercenaries are stateless and not bound to the defined boundaries of sovereignty, making them the ideal operatives in areas where sovereignty is unclear.
Additionally, the idea that mercenaries can be utilized as a tool for political convenience plays into the argument that PMCs should function as peacekeepers. As discussed in class, states often refuse to directly use their troops in areas of conflict because they prefer there to be a less explicit political presence in the area. In the case of Sierra Leone, US aid was limited to flying in one load of ammunitions and a battalion of Bangladeshi reinforcements at a highly-inflated price. This limited involvement of the US was attributed to the fact that the US preferred not to be directly involved with peacekeeping in Africa after the death of US peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993 (Fleshman). While the US did not seek to avoid a clear involvement with peacekeeping in Sierra Leone by utilizing mercenaries, doing so would have effectively decreased the feeling of an American presence in the area.
In the research I conducted on the privatization of peacekeeping, I did find myself mostly convinced that PMCs could very well be an adequate supplement—or even replacement—to peacekeeping missions. However, although it is clear that PMCs have the potential to effectively conduct peacekeeping in areas where organizations such as the UN have difficulties, what is not evident is whether or not PMCs would feasibly be willing to conduct such activities. PMCs are primarily driven by interests of personal gain, and must keep a respected reputation in order to maintain present and future contracts. They do this by being selective in their clients and avoiding clients who are internationally condemned (Brooks 130). Due to this, there is a potential that if participation in a peacekeeping mission could damage their reputation as a company, they would be just as unwilling to engage in such affairs as a state who seeks to keep from marring their reputation in an area of conflict.
Additionally, PMCs still find themselves avoiding association with the less respectable mercenaries in Africa during the 60’s and 70’s (Brooks 135). I connected this with the finding that the African PMC that defeated RUF rebels in Sierra Leone became defunct in 1999 due to an anti-mercenary law passed by South Africa. With this in mind, it is a possibility that the world simply regards mercenaries too cynically to associate PMCs as effective peacekeepers.
Works Cited
Brooks, Doug. "Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services." International Peacekeeping 7.4 (2000): 129-44. Taylor & Francis Online. 8 Nov. 2007. Web. 11 Dec. 2011.
Butler, Robert J., and Stephen F. Marin. "Executive Outcomes." Foreign Military Studies Office. July 1999. Web. 11 Dec. 2011.
Fleshman, Michael. "Sierra Leone: Peacekeeping Under Fire." Africa Recovery Online: A United Nations Publication. United Nations. Web. 11 Dec. 2011.
"UNAMSIL." United Nations. Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information. Web. 11 Dec. 2011.
"UNAMSIL-United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone-Background." United Nations. Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information. Web. 11 Dec. 2011.
Great job Aurora! Very interesting!
ReplyDeleteYour conclusions about mercenaries are enlightening, especially the part about PMC's sometimes not taking jobs because it might damage their reputation. I agree that mercenaries can be effective peacekeepers. What do you see as the future for mercenaries in conflict-zones? DO you see mercenaries becoming more prominent in peacekeeping missions?
JB—my feelings in regards to whether or not mercenaries will become more prominent in peacekeeping are mixed. I agree that they are capable of efficiency in the field. Their statelessness allows for more freedom without the restraints of politics. Also, the PMCs most likely to be utilized by states in missions have well-trained and highly-capable operatives. However, ironically the use of PMCs for peacekeeping can bring about both a negative image of a state that a state might have been avoiding, and a negative image of mercenaries for getting involved in what might be a highly-political affair. The state that utilizes PMCs could be chastised by those who cynically associate PMCs with the violent African mercenaries of the 60’s and 70’s. And the PMC that engages in a peacekeeping mission could potentially ‘politicize’ themselves and eliminate their statelessness that they often view as an advantage. The way I see it is this: PMCs are capable but not always willing, and states may understand the efficiency of PMCs but could also be wary of hiring them.
ReplyDeleteGreat paper, Aurora. An excellent summary of the trends and evolutions of the PMC over the last few centuries is PW Singer's 'Corporate Warriors': it has, if I recall correctly, a chapter on EO.
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