Monday, December 5, 2011

Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement

Jenny Sue Ross

December 5, 2011

World Politics: Professor Craig

Extra Credit Paper 3


“Even a non-state actor has domestic politics.” This statement was made today by Wendy Pearlman, a professor from Northwestern University, while giving a talk on her book Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement. I feel that this statement sums up the main point of her lecture: the internal workings of a non-state actor influence its actions as well as the external factors more commonly considered. Professor Pearlman’s focus was on the Palestinian nationalist movement, which has a history of both violence and nonviolence. Her theory is that the internal structure of the movement is a factor in the presence or absence of violence.


Professor Pearlman’s theory, entitled “Organizational Mediation Theory of Protest” essentially breaks down to this: a cohesive movement has more of a possibility to be nonviolent than a fragmented movement, and a fragmented movement is more likely to be violent than a cohesive movement. She clarified that these are not solid rules, but generally they are the case.


A cohesive movement is one with central leadership, a strong organizational structure and popular consensus of a goal. With respect to the Palestinian Nationalist movement, this was the case during the First Intifada when the UNLU (United National Leadership of the Uprising) was a clear, legitimate leader, there were popular committees to handle issues like education and agriculture, and the goal of the movement was agreed to be achieving statehood. (The First Intifada was an uprising of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in 1987 and lasted until 1993. This movement was majorly peaceful and involved protests boycotts, and attempts at self-sufficiency. It was followed by the Second Intifada from 2000 until 2005, which was much more violent.) Cohesive movements like the First Intifada have the ability to coordinate the masses, have popular support for a central cause, can control opposition, and can use restraint. The central leadership of a cohesive movement can also adapt, which helps facilitate nonviolence. If an area has low morale and it looks like the frustration could lead to violence, protests and other acts can be moved to other areas to let the frustrated people rejuvenate. These abilities allow a cohesive movement to avoid violence. This being said, just because a movement can avoid the use of violence does not mean that it will. Cohesive movements are relatively controlled so they can consciously choose a path that is followed by the masses. This also allows such movements to establish ceasefires in movements where there is violence because there is central leadership with whom the ceasefire can be made and whose decision the masses will follow.


A fragmented movement lacks the characteristics previously stated. (There is no central leadership, there is no organizational structure and there is no one clear goal for the movement.) This was the case for the Second Intifada. Fragmented movements have no way of controlling the masses, so even if one group desires nonviolence they have no control over the rest. Also, the factions of the movements are directly in conflict with one another for the top position in the movement. This conflict can be a cause of the violence. The lack of leadership in fragmented movements also makes violence difficult to end because there is no group with the authority to make and enforce a ceasefire.


Professor Pearlman connected her theory to modern day issues related to Palestinian statehood by explaining that the movement is currently fragmented because there is a divide between Hamas and Fatah. According to her theory, for the best chance at achieving non-violence, and in order to have a true leader to deal with, Fatah and Hamas need to reconcile their differences. These two groups have started reconciliation, but it has met major opposition from Israel, the US and European countries who feel Hamas is a terrorist group and illegitimate. Professor Pearlman’s theory is very interesting when connected to the present day situation because what initially seems like the unthinkable, reconciliation, is said to be necessary.


I found her theory very interesting and enlightening. I drew a connection between this idea and the two levels of diplomacy and their win-sets. We considered the domestic and international win-sets for states, but Professor Pearlman suggests that there are these levels in non-state actors as well. From what I learned at this lecture I think considering the internal, domestic, situation of a non-state actor is something we often look past but should consider when analyzing and dealing with such actors.

5 comments:

  1. It seems like there is a fine line between a fragmented movement and a cohesive one, but it may be easier for groups to transition than we would think. It definitely seems unlikely that any minority group can effect their policies through the use of violence and anyone serious about creating a positive change for themselves should seek a nonviolent path, as the speaker made clear. However, do you think that a group that was previously known as a terrorist organization is likely to be able to lobby for their interests as a nonviolent group? For example the terrorist group from el País Vasco in the north of spain was a violent movement, but recently has agreed to fight for what it wants without the use of force. It would be difficult to see Spain give any legitimacy to this group moving forward. What do you think?

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  2. I, like Adam, am also interested in the idea of transitioning between a fragmented movement and a cohesive one. The steps sound simple enough: rally behind one leader or idea, and start organizing. But did Professor Pearlman talk at all about the steps or complexities behind transitioning? What are your thoughts on this process? It sounds like it is in a group's best interest to be cohesive and thus nonviolent, but would you agree that that is also the more difficult strategy to attain? that it's simpler to resort to violence rather than organizing, and thus there is discourse?

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  3. Adam, I'm interested in how things will work out for ETA in Spain, too, especially since it was an exception to Professor Pearlman's general, being a violent cohesive movement. It seems that once a movement has become violent it will be hard for them to change their public image. After reading this paper, I was wondering about the point that Professor Pearlman made about moving protests to another location when it looks like a situation is going to boil over. It sounds like a good idea, but it doesn't seem very realistic to me - how would the protestors be moved, and who would provide this transportation? Aside from logistics, if the point of protesting is to ruffle some feathers, how would they be able to tell the difference between an emotionally charged atmosphere and an overly tense atmosphere where violence might break out?

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  4. Adam,
    I agree that transitioning between types of movements is definitely possible. (This is why the Palestinian Nationalist movement was able to be used a case study for comparing the two types.) The issue with applying the theory to the group in Spain you are asking about is that it is not a movement by itself. Due to this difference I'm not sure this is an accurate comparison. A movement is often made of several groups (like the Palestinian Authority, PLO, Hamas and the Fatah which used to be independent of the PLO) and is more about the general ideology than any specific organization. Still, the PLO was once considered a terrorist group and is now seen as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The group removed the calls to violence in its charter in 1993 and had a legitimate leader accepted by world leaders. I think this is what made the transition form terrorist group to a legitimate organization.

    Caroline,
    You make an assumption that I tried to avoid since Professor Pearlman stressed the importance of avoiding it. Being a cohesive movement does not guarantee that a movement will be nonviolent. A cohesive movement is more able to be nonviolent, but can still choose violence. The talk was not really about the possibility of transitioning, but like I said to Adam, I think having a legitimate leader and making formal efforts to renounce violence are important. I kind of see it in terms of power and reciprocity. Violence is embracing power and nonviolence is embracing reciprocity. In order to transition to nonviolence one must formally cut ties to power and take steps to fit the diplomatic mold (a leader, a formal set of goals, etc).

    Alana,
    What you say about moving protests makes sense but it is not exactly what Professor Pearlman meant. During the first intifada there were street protests but also professional protests. Shopkeepers closed their stores during certain hours to show solidarity; lawyer and other professionals were utilized as well. They would not physically move the protesters, but hold a march in another town with those people and have another town's professionals take action for a while to give the others a break.

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  5. THis probably isn't WORLD politics, but how do you think this dichotomy between cohesive nonviolence and fragmented violence relates to the occupy movement? Undoubtedly the movement is fragmented on a national level, but most action takes place around the local occupations which have a degree of cohesion. There has been a large focus on nonviolence, but undoubtedly Occupy is far more cconfrontational than previous protests. Do you have any thoughts on this?

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