Mercenaries and Arab Spring

In class on Monday we discussed mercenaries and how they affect International Relations. We mostly examine the relationship between the United States and private military forces and contractors. However, the remaining dictatorships in the Middle East have used mercenaries more frequently and prevalently in the aftermath of the Arab Spring with compelling results. Specifically, the Syrian government has been using mercenaries from Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. Free Syrian Army chief Riad al-Asaad has reported that Hezbollah and infamous Iraq’s anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr have sent these private mercenary forces. Moreover Ammar al-Wawi, the spokesman for the Free Syrian army, has indicated that this action has been taken because the Syrian Arab Army has begun to lose control over its own security forces. In clarification, the Free Syrian Army is the main armed group in opposition to the Syrian government while the Syrian Arab Army is the major military force of the state of Syria. As evidence of Al-Wawi’s claim, the Jordanian government has reported that the state has received over one hundred Syrian military and police defectors. Subsequently, the state of Jordan has declared that it will host these Syrian defectors.

The case in Syria is symptomatic a deeper problem in the Middle East. A United Nations expert group has recently warned of “an alarming resurgence in the use of mercenaries and a major expansion in military and security companies operating without regulation or accountability.” In other words, states in the Middle East are using PMFs to engage in conflicts and these mercenaries are not regulated and are not accountable in the same ways as traditional military forces. This resurgence is relevant is highly relevant to the topics that we have discussed. First, it reminds me of Professor Chenoweth’s talk on civil resistance. On her talk, Professor Chenoweth demonstrated that non-violent resistance movements are statistically more effective at achieve their goals than violent resistance groups. One of the variables that Chenoweth examined was the defection of security forces. That is, non-violent resistance groups are more effective at gaining support of national security forces. The support from these defected security forces helps resistance groups gain momentum and traction. The case in Syria and throughout the Middle East extends Professor Chenoweth’s argument ushering in a new line of thought. It answers the following question: how does a state respond when its security force defects? One could do an in-depth analysis on this issue alone. Substantiating Professor Chenoweth’s hypothesis, it seems that the use of mercenaries is also an indicator of upcoming political and social upheaval. As luck would have it, news sources have indicated the Libyan government also used the PMFs from not just Serbia, Ukraine, and Romania, but also Syria. The same UN expert group that I previously referenced has corroborated this claim and also asserted that the same in true in the Ivory Coast. In those two countries, rebel groups have deposed the dictators despite the state’s use of mercenary forces.

The ineffectiveness of PMFs in the Arab world can also be used to draw interesting conclusions about international structure. Additionally there are many further lines of inquiry that can be speculated upon. Personally, I wondered if this habitual use of mercenaries by Arab dictatorships was a result of the rational model, the organizational process model, or government bargaining. It seems like to be that policymakers in these states operate under some form of prospect theory, in which their reference point is to have a security force to defend their command. Once this force is lost, it must be immediately replaced and PMFs offer a viable, quick replacement. Despite this hypothesis, I lack evidence to substantiate any claim. Moreover, the use of mercenaries by both the global North and the global South can be used to further examine the North-South gap militarily. Traditionally, when developed states and developing or undeveloped states are compared militarily, it is in terms of their technological capabilities and raw manpower. The use of mercenaries, which are outside the bounds of national forces, can provide a fresh examination of the differences between the militaries of the global North and South. All in all, the appearance of mercenaries in Arab Spring pervades through many issues that IR scholars discuss and is a topic that should not be ignored or missed.

Works Referenced

http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=211101

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/21336-rebel-army-chief-accuses-hizbullah-of-sending-mercenaries-to-syria

http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/syria-rebels-assad-regime-recruiting-iranian-hezbollah-mercenaries-1.398010

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/army.htm

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/11/2011111214047782304.html

http://www.sawtbeirut.com/lebanon-news/rebel-army-chief-accuses-hizbullah-of-sending-mercenaries-to-syria/

http://honors-wp2011.blogspot.com/2011/09/professor-chenoweths-talk-on-civil.html