Foreign Policy: Saudi Arabia, Iran & Assassination

On October 11, the United States government charged Monsoor Arbisiar, a dual US-Iranian citizen, and Gholan Shakuri, an alleged member of the a division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, with conspiracy to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the Unite States, Adel Al-Jubeir. They were also charged with conspiracy to attack both the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington, DC. Their failed attempt marks a visible clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran, who have been at odds since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. This conflict has only deepened in the months of Arab Spring. Mohsen M. Milani, Professor of Politics and Chair of the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida in Tampa, explains that both countries “are competing for dominance in global energy markets and nuclear technology and for political influence in the Persian Gulf and the Levant [geographic region and culture zone bounded by the Mediterranean to the west, the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Arabian Desert to the south, and the Syrian Desert to the east].” Essentially, Iran and Saudi Arabia are battling to become the dominant oil power of the Persian Gulf. There are also deep sectarian undertones. Iran predominantly practices Shi’a Islam while Saudi Arabia practices Sunni Islam.  The United States has adopted official foreign policy regarding the issue. The US strategy has been to ally with Saudi Arabia to counteract Iranian instability. The recent assassination attempt expresses two crucial questions regarding foreign policy and state action – what factors caused the state of Iran to sanction an assassination attempt against a sovereign state and what is the rationale behind the current US policy regarding the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Let us first discuss current United States policy. The process of forming foreign policy can be analyzed from three differing perspectives. In the rational model, decision makers set goals, evaluate the relative importance of those goals, analyze potential cost-benefit yields, and choose the course of maximum potential yield. In the organizational process model, foreign policy decisions are explained by standardized operating procedures and also by the nature of the fact that information is condensed as it moves to higher offices. Many smaller decisions are made at the lower level before information even reaches the highest office. Lastly, the government bargaining model states that foreign policy is the result of the bargaining process among various government agencies acting on differing self-interests.

While each of these models partially explains the current US policy regarding Iranian-Saudi tension, the rational model sheds the most light on the issue. The United States has two chief goals in the Persian Gulf – to gain a powerful energy ally and to limit nuclear proliferation. The desire to limit weapons of mass destruction is heavily evidenced by the original logic behind the US invasion of Iraq. In a radio address, former President George W. Bush stated that “our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.” In regards to the US oil strategy, The Brookings Institution writes that “…there is no escaping that the region that has grabbed the greatest global attention during the past half century in matters of oil” and that “ the United States and the West have continued to define the region as being vitally important.” American interests in the Persian Gulf are well defined. So what course should the United States follow to achieve these goals? As previously stated, Iran and Saudi Arabia stand as the two competitors for energy dominance in the region. In order to satisfy its energy goals, the United States must ally with one state or the other. To limit nuclear proliferation, the US chose Saudi Arabia as its ally to limit Iran’s nuclear program. The US-Saudi alliance stands as a counter-balance to Iran’s nuclear efforts. The US government achieves both of its goals in the Persian Gulf with this partnership.

Let us now examine the factors that caused the state of Iran to attempt to assassinate an ambassador of its adversary, Saudi Arabia. While Professor Milani mentions that “the nature of Iranian government involvement remains to be seen”, it would be hard to assert that it had no hand in the matter, given Saudi-Iranian history and that one of the would-be assassins is an alleged member of the Iranian Quds Force, a division of the Revolutionary Guards. So why would the state of Iran adopt this foreign policy approach? Once again, the rational model perspective partially explains this behavior. Though the rational model asserts that states act on the principle of cost-benefit analysis, it also acknowledges that uncertainty about that analysis complicates decision-making. States must attach probabilities to the success or failure of each course of action. Given this complication, some states are accepting of risk while others are averse to risk. Iran’s decision to attempt assassination was a bold and risky foreign policy move, begging another question: In terms of making foreign policy, why is Iran accepting of risk? The answer to this question is relatively simple: Having no allies in the Persian Gulf, Iran has very little to lose. The state of Iran has traditionally poor relations with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, which has become a dominant force in Middle Eastern politics.  Saudi Arabia would jeopardize its foreign relations if it made a similar play for power and dominance.

Though the rational model is quite convincing, one does not have to accept it in order to explain Iran’s behavior. Contrary to popular belief, Iran has not been completely damning of the United States and its policies. In fact, the state issued its first official state of goodwill towards an American leader since the Iranian Revolution when Barack Obama won the presidency. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad congratulated him, expressing that, “Iran welcomes basic and fair changes in U.S. policies and conducts. I hope you will prefer real public interests and justice to the never-ending demands of a selfish minority and seize the opportunity to serve people so that you will be remembered with high esteem.” So how does one reconcile this logic with an attempted assault on American soil? I point to the fact that one of the would-be assassins is an alleged member of the Iranian Quds Force whose primary task is to export Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Mohsen Sazegara, a former high-ranking Tehran official, explains, “ Outside the country, they [the Revolutionary Guard] operate through the Quds force, which is out of Ahmadinejad's control.” He further asserts, “Even the president does not know what the Revolutionary Guards does outside of Iran. They directly report to the leader [Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei].” Sazegera’s testimony lends itself to a distorted version of the government bargaining model. While the government bargaining model states that foreign policy decisions reflect a mix of state agency interests, Sazegera suggests that foreign policy can be the result of different state agencies acting independently of one another. Both of these ideas soundly refute the rational model, which asserts that states are unitary actors.

The rational model and the government bargaining model can adequately explain the both recent assassination attempt and US involvement in Saudi-Iran relations on the whole. However, I still wonder what insight the organizational process can give on the matter. What standard operating procedures exist within the United States that caused it to align with Saudi Arabia? What are the procedures that exist within Iran that allow risky behaviors? I also wonder how these models can predict the US-Saudi response to the Iranian aggression. In order to further investigate the issue, we must simply wait and see what measures we, the United States, take in the matter.

Works Cited

"Iranian Dissident Warns of US Actions against Iran." Google News. AFP, 23 Aug. 2003. Web. 12 Oct. 2011.

"Iranian Leader Welcomes Obama Win." BBC News. BBC, 6 Nov. 2008. Web. 12 Oct. 2011.

Milani, Mohsen M. "Explaining the Iran-Saudi Rivalry." Web log post. CNN World. Cables News Network, 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 12 Oct. 2011.

"President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom." The White House. US Federal Government, 22 Mar. 2003. Web. 12 Oct. 2011.

Telhami, Shibley. "The Persian Gulf: Understanding the American Oil Strategy."Brookings. The Brookings Institution, Spring 2002. Web. 12 Oct. 2011.